

A stylized map of Haiti is centered within a large white circle. The map uses various shades of green and blue to represent different regions and water bodies. The background of the entire cover is a solid teal color.

# ***Elections in Haiti***

Aid, Intervention  
& the Developmental State

Thesis by Anisa Holmes

*ELECTIONS in HAITI*  
*Aid, Intervention, & the Developmental State*

*Thesis by Anisa Holmes*  
*2016*

## *ABSTRACT*

This thesis is an attempt to examine the interplay of actors involved in Haiti's elections past and present. My base argument is that aid and intervention in support of democratic elections in Haiti has been detrimental to the development of the Haitian state, political order, and economic growth. I support this claim with historical evidence from elections dating back to 1987. Through my research I found that aid measures and international involvement in Haiti often include actions that fund corrupt incumbents, policies that professedly support transparency and democracy but show favoritism to certain candidates, expenditures that favor third-party contractors, and covert action that funds military groups that have undermined democratic progress. Following the events of the 2015 Haitian elections and how they were mishandled bolstered my claim that aid directed towards elections provides no net gains to democratization and equality. However, I attempt to frame my critique of aid institutions in Haiti through a realist perspective. Foreign assistance has become a vital lifeline for many sectors of the Haitian government and economy, and as such a proposal for change in Haiti cannot exclude the role of aid. With grievances and realist restraints hand in hand, I argue that aid donors should instead attempt to bolster institutional development and legitimate governing bodies rather than continuing with surface-level efforts to support the pretense of elections that have become the norm in Haiti today.

I hope to question the prevailing assumption that democracy building through policies like elections promotion is the key to transforming developing nations. But furthermore, I will also question the problematic methods through which the international community attempts to achieve this transformation. My critique of aid organizations, NGOs, and US intervention in Haiti ties into a greater commentary of the present condition of development policy and globalization, which places an emphasis on the role of neo-Tocquevillian civil society and neoliberal economic policies. I argue that this prevailing paradigm of development fails to consider the diverse historical path of political evolution and precludes state development and national sovereignty, which is vital to developing true democratic institutions.

Keywords: Haiti, elections, aid, developmental state, civil society, globalization

## *ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS*

I owe special thanks to my thesis advisor and first reader, Professor Paget Henry. Without his guidance and support I wouldn't have been able to complete this thesis. Many thanks for your friendship, insight and encouragement for me to think critically about new concepts and theories. Also thanks to Professor Patrick Sylvain, my second reader. I've learned so much about Haitian politics and culture through his class Framing Haiti and the personal anecdotes he's shared.

Thank you to all my professors in the Development Studies department – Nitsan Chorev, Elena Shih, Jose Itsigsohn, Jeremy Ferwerda – and peers who have created such a warm and intellectually vibrant community, where I have come to feel at home!

Thanks also to the truly inspirational and tireless members of IJDH, particularly Betsey Chace, Brian Concannon, and Valerie Dionne-Lanier who welcomed me despite my brief time there and really piqued my interest in elections and development in Haiti. Thanks again to Brian Concannon who took the time to provide some insightful commentary on Haitian elections in an interview.

Of course nothing I've achieved could have been possible without the support of my loving family that always encourages me in my endeavors.

## *TABLE of CONTENTS*

v	<a href="#"><u>Abstract</u></a>
vii	<a href="#"><u>Acknowledgements</u></a>
1	<a href="#"><u>Introduction</u></a>
11	<a href="#"><u>Literature Review</u></a>
29	<a href="#"><u>Theoretical Analysis</u></a>
45	<a href="#"><u>How Elections Work in Haiti</u></a>
65	<a href="#"><u>The 2015 Election Cycle</u></a>
87	<a href="#"><u>The Decline of the Developmental State</u></a>
103	<a href="#"><u>Conclusions</u></a>
111	<a href="#"><u>Appendix A</u></a>
115	<a href="#"><u>Appendix B</u></a>
125	<a href="#"><u>Works Cited</u></a>

# 1

## Introduction

6 *Personal Story*

7 *Methods*

For most voters in the United States, Election Day's greatest inconvenience comes in the form of long queues at the polling station or a surly poll worker. Nevertheless for about 60 percent of American adults, these are trials we proudly bear in order to participate in one of the most fundamental of exchanges between citizen and government. Member countries of the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) from Belgium to Japan, partake in regular and efficient elections, a practice with roots stretching back to the original Athenian paradigm of representative democracy. Transparent and regular elections are not only a shared practice of nations belonging to the Global North, but they also serve as a meter with which to measure the progress of 'developing' nations. Unfortunately, what is often forgotten is the long history of the oppression and exclusion of citizens from exercising their right to vote even in the most developed countries. It continues to strike me that just a few generations past, members of my own family were engaged in a fight to ensure the protection of their voting rights. While certain countries enjoy these privileges, they are certainly not universally enjoyed or practiced, and should not be taken for granted. Moreover, each modern democracy has undergone its own unique political transition and state formation, and all these struggles can be placed within the context of a greater struggle for representation of the individual globally.

Ultimately, the fight for fair elections is important, both symbolically and pragmatically. Elections are the thread that ties the people to the government, forming a social contract to which both sides are, ideally, held accountable. As straightforward as such an agreement may seem, accomplishing an untainted

relationship between citizens and elected officials can be incredibly difficult. These difficulties are imminently visible in Haiti, a country burdened with a heavy load of historical, political, and environmental baggage. Starting in 2012, Haiti faced a crisis of lapsed parliamentary representation; culminating in delayed elections and an unchecked presidential branch by 2015. The three-year delay led to an incomplete legislative body with only 10 of 30 Senators remaining in office. This number is an insufficient figure to pass any legislative measures. Moreover, all members of the House of Deputies terms' have expired along with all municipal officials and mayors. As I began writing this thesis, the Municipal positions had been refilled at the President's discretion through special appointment. Protesters were decrying this failure of democracy, calling for outgoing President Michel Martelly to be brought to justice and new elections to be scheduled. More than a year later, despite attempts to secure a newly elected governing body, the elections that took place have been highly contested and a provisional government has been appointed to oversee a renewed election effort.

But Haiti's current political climate, and the impasse it faces as of April 2016, is not simply a product of bad governance or corruption; it is also the embodiment of a historical legacy of foreign patronage, mismanagement, and coercion. Foreign influence in Haiti, most frequently on behalf of the United States, has come in various forms. From the U.S. occupation of Haiti (1914-1934) to aid provisions purporting to promote fair election proceedings in 1987 and beyond, foreign influence and policy has had a hand in governmental and institutional procedures. Such a history shaped by the effects of imperialism and foreign aid is not unique among developing countries. So, what real effect do foreign actors have in promoting democracy in countries like Haiti? Is foreign aid benevolent, insidious, or simply ineffective? And do developing nations establish

accountability and legitimacy to greater success without foreign assistance? These questions can be examined through the context of the Haitian elections; Does foreign aid impede democratization and development in Haiti? And, is the push towards democratization as a tool in development policy problematic?

Fundamental operations of governments like elections provide citizens with the power to shape their country's legislation, often serving as a stepping-stone to greater equality and political rights. Not only is this an important topic for developing nations or nations with weak institutions, but it has implications towards the policy choices of donor countries as well. While gaining further insight towards the importance of elections is particularly salient to Haiti, parallels can be drawn to other developing nations looking to assert their legitimacy through the performance of their governmental institutions. My research question is also framed with an intention to delve into the history of interventionism in Haiti as a way of understanding how foreign interests are pursued and how influence is leveraged.

My thesis is comprised of five main sections. The first is an introductory overview of the history of Haiti, with an emphasis on understanding the evolution of its political development and state formation. In this section I note that the issues prevalent in Haiti today are the product of path dependence and greatly informed by a long precedence of intervention, authoritarianism and coups as a means of power acquisition. With this historical framework in place, I begin to address my main research question in the following 4 sections. First, I look at democratization, elections, and foreign aid's utility from a theoretical perspective. There, I come to the conclusion that the use of aid to promote elections will not produce any positive gains towards free and fair contestation. In the next chapter, I focus on supporting my theoretical claims with evidence

from past elections in Haiti, using the 1990 and 2010 elections as case studies. I address the current election cycle in the subsequent chapter. Finally, in the last chapter, I look at foreign aid and global civil society within the greater context of the globalized world. I use insight gleaned from the struggle for fair elections in Haiti to inform my critique on contemporary development policy and suggest a shift in focus from election promotion to investment in strong institutional bodies.

My qualitative analysis will use elections results, policy statements, and aid accounts from the OECD, United States Agency for International Development (USAID) and the Provisional Electoral Council in Haiti (Conseil Électoral Provisoire (CEP)). In my research I considered possible correlations between aid and the electoral outcome and used multinational studies that examine the role of both foreign aid and Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) in development outcomes to place Haiti within a greater frame of reference. Most importantly, to understand Haiti's elections and outcomes, I delved into articles and commentary of prior and upcoming elections, human rights reports, and investigations concerning interventionary measures as well as the historical foundations and trends. Through all this I hope to not only answer my research question, Does foreign aid impede political and economic development in Haiti? but begin to ask What measures should be taken to promote political order and economic development in struggling nations? Ideally, the political context of Haitian elections will serve as a micro-view to the greater theme of democracy building, state formation, and development within a globalized world.



## *Personal Story*

I'm not Haitian, but I think it's impossible for anyone to probe into Haiti's history and culture without becoming deeply fascinated by it. My interest in Haiti began after reading about the elections crisis, as I had long been interested in the role of elections and politics within the sphere of development studies. Admittedly, I had an idealistic and naïve view of how elections work. But as I learned more about Haiti's particular circumstances, it became clear that this was a situation that would need a far more extensive solution. To gain further insight into elections in Haiti, I joined the Institute for Justice and Democracy in Haiti (IJDH) as Elections Intern for a few months. The IJDH is the U.S. partner organization to the Bureau des Avocats Internationaux (BAI) based in Haiti, made of Haitian lawyers who prosecute on behalf of victims in human rights cases. The IJDH is also made of a legal team that supports the BAI, and other grassroots movements to support the people of Haiti. That experience gave me so much insight towards greater struggles within Haiti, including IJDH's ongoing challenge to the United Nation's (UN) impunity through an ongoing Cholera litigation. Speaking with the members of the IJDH was informative and more than restored my faith in the ability of NGOs to do good work by supporting the people's struggle rather than taking advantage of an already bereft country.

Later I would learn more through Haitian friends who introduced me to various anecdotes, cultural idiosyncrasies and amazing food like soup joumou. There's still a lot for me to learn, but it's been an amazing experience to understand more about Haitian culture through books, film, and personal interactions. Haitian history and political struggles have played out at times like an epic tragedy. Yet, despite the struggles they have been through, the Haitian

people continue to express a great capacity for joy and community. Never having been to Haiti, this strong sense of community is extremely tangible within the expat community here in the United States. Even so, the problems Haiti faces are real, and seemingly never-ending. Here, the Haitian proverb, *Dèyè mòn gen mòn*, or 'beyond mountains are mountains' has never felt more real than in their struggle to develop long lasting democracy, stability, and economic prosperity. My only hope in writing this thesis is to contribute to the existing literature concerning the role of aid in elections and development by delivering a specific case study in Haiti, and in doing so help in some small way to prevent the real tragedy; for history to continue to repeat itself when the lessons it has to offer are so abundant and so clear.

## *Methods*

My analysis aims to show that despite the aid given to promote free and fair elections, evidence shows that it is not only ineffective, but also potentially detrimental to democracy development. This evidence will support the postulations laid out in the Theoretical Section. The analysis will explain how the current Haitian government serves as the 'incumbent regime' in Dahl's traditional model of metagame transition, and that aid is being used as resource to fund suppression of the opposition instead of transparency.

In order to support the claim that foreign aid is detrimental to governmental accountability in Haiti, I will conduct a two-part analysis of contemporary Haitian elections. The first section is an analysis of Haitian elections in the years 1987-2010. This section will incorporate a summative historical timeline, excerpts from legislation and documents released by

the Conseil Electoral Provisoire, news sources, data from election results, reports and budget allocations from international aid groups, and information released through the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA). The second part will incorporate many of the same types of data and evidence, but will focus on the current 2015 elections, and the implications of legislation, election delays and election related incidents of violence or exclusion.

Additionally, I will use ethnographic notes from the Institute for Justice and Democracy in Haiti (IJDH) where I worked as an intern for several months in 2015 to supplement the last chapter, 'The Decline of the Developmental State'. The notes will address the work of an NGO promoting transparency and democracy in Haiti and what strategies are used to promote Haitian sovereignty and promote international accountability. This will include excerpts of an interview with Brian Concannon, founder of IJDH.

Some concerns associated with the methods used to address my research topic include the timeframe of the ongoing elections. With the elections taking place as I wrote this thesis, there was a wide variety of shifting narratives from the news sources I read. I had less time to adequately grasp the effects of the elections as a whole and the expected trajectory of Haiti's government in its wake. Additionally, while election results are available, think tanks and research institutes tend to wait to formally publish accuracy reports until months to years after the elections have occurred, once their investigations are complete. It will therefore be hard for me to draw solid conclusions from the ongoing election results without such supporting materials to consult. This is also exemplary of one of the main issues I have found pertaining to Haitian elections; accurate quantitative and analytical reports of Haitian election results arrive too late in the election cycle to make a difference, and do not seem to be consulted while

planning elections or analyzing contested results. Instead, the international community has consistently pushed for timely elections rather than fully transparent ones.

Additionally, while the FOIA documents are informative and provide a small glimpse into the inner workings of the U.S. State Department while dealing with Haitian elections it does not reveal the full intentions of such a body. It is impossible to know the exact reasons for which the department advocates certain policies over others or promotes certain parties over others. Additionally, this calls attention toward the issue of acrimony among different US political branches as they advocate for different stances on involvement in Haiti. Even within the US government different actors become involved in Haitian politics in different ways, sometimes having dramatic effects on election results. At times, these contrasting actions from different bodies within the US government make it difficult to discern the difference between aid and imperialism. However, the main aim of my research is not to prove that bodies within the U.S. and aid groups necessarily have nefarious intentions, but to prove that regardless of their true intentions, aid has not been beneficial to the transparency of Haitian elections.

# 2

## Literature Review

- 12 *Republik d'Ayiti*
- 14 *Political & Social Foundations*
- 19 *Contemporary Haiti (1915-present)*
- 24 *Haiti, the Earthquake & Moving Forward*
- 25 *Aid Frameworks and Implications*

## Republik d'Ayiti


Haiti is a republic that occupies the western third of the island of Hispaniola, which houses the Dominican Republic to the east. Haiti's population is approximately 10 million, of which roughly 25 percent live in the city's centrally located capital, Port-au-Prince. The climate is tropical and the terrain mostly elevated and mountainous. There are few trees or forests. The country itself is divided into 10 regional and administrative departments.

Haiti's government comprises an Executive Branch consisting of the President, the Prime Minister, and the Cabinet (chosen by the prime minister), a Bicameral Legislative Branch consisting of the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate, and a Judicial Branch consisting of a Supreme Court and lower courts. The Haitian legal system is similar to that of the French and U.S. and is influenced by the Napoleonic code. The official state languages are French and Creole<sup>1</sup>. Elections operate under a two-round voting system where if no candidate wins a majority in the first round, a second round is held. The presidential term is 5 years long and presidents are not allowed two consecutive terms, although they are allowed a total of two terms in office. The Senate terms are 6 years long and elections are staggered with 1/3 being elected every two years (in theory). There are a total of 30 Senate seats and 119 seats in the House of Deputies<sup>2</sup>. Additionally, the length of a Deputy's term has been scheduled to increase from 4 years to 5 years.

Today, the Republic of Haiti is commonly known as the poorest country in the Western Hemisphere, and unfortunately there are several social indicators that reinforce this title. The life expectancy for the average Haitian is 57 years and the literacy rate is about 60.7 percent. Besides the 2.4 million living in Port-Au Prince,

<sup>1</sup>Creole was recognized as an official language in 1961.

<sup>2</sup>The number of seats in the House of Deputies increased from 99 seats in 2015.



## Haitian Government

### EXECUTIVE

- President
- Prime Minister
- Cabinet

### LEGISLATIVE

- House of Deputies
- Senate

### JUDICIAL

- Supreme Court
- Lower Courts

the population in general is highly urbanized, with an urban population of 58.6 percent of the total. The annual rate of change of urbanization is increasing at 3.78 percent. The World Bank estimates that only one in five children of secondary-school age attends school, and only one in four of the general population have access to clean water.

### *Political and Social Foundations of the Haitian Nation*

The core issues that strangle contemporary Haiti include the divisive hierarchy of social class, internal political divisions, governmental corruption, a history of militarism, and a legacy of debt and indebtedness to foreign aid. These problems can be traced inexorably to different points in Haiti's history, from its establishment as the first and only country in the entire world to have a successful slave revolt, to its harrowing experiences under the Duvalier dictatorship in the 1980s. Haiti was, and continues to be an emblem of triumph over oppression, yet this nation established by former slaves who successfully defeated the French, British, and Spanish forces, is today stricken with abject poverty and serious political woes. In understanding Haiti, it is key to grasp both the victorious historical legacy and the harsh realities the country has faced ever since their self-achieved liberation.

The earliest moment of Western intervention in Haiti began with Christopher Columbus's arrival on the island, called Ayiti by the native Tainos, and named La Española by the Spanish settlers. After establishing the island as a sugar-producing colony, much of the indigenous population died following acts of brutality, slavery, and subjugation at the hands of the Spanish. The annihilation of the natives led to the importation of slaves from Africa. In 1697, the French had established control over the Western half of the island through the Treaty of Ryswick, a divide

<sup>3</sup> Demographic stats retrieved from the CIA World Factbook

that continues to create tensions between Haiti and the Dominican Republic today. Economically, Haiti became the world's powerhouse producer of coffee and sugar through the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. The economy was organized in a traditional plantation economy system with wealthy French plantation owners reaping the benefits of slave labor. Slaves were generally permitted to cultivate their own small plots of land for subsistence. Besides the distinctions between slaves and white plantation owners, hierarchies and divisions between people of African descent began to shape. Mulattos, or black descendants of slave owners, were often shown preferential treatment. Some were granted freedom and began to form a class known as the *gens de couleurs*<sup>4</sup>. By the end of the nineteenth century, many gens de couleurs were slave owners themselves and had successful enterprises of their own, particularly in the coffee industry.

The Haitian Slave Revolution, a militaristic operation led by Toussaint Louverture, came at the turn of the nineteenth century and was in part a consequence of the revolution in France and the rights to which French citizens were beginning to claim for themselves. The French Revolution presented an opportunity for landowners in Haiti, both white and mulatto, to gain more rights, greater independence from France and lowered taxation. Mulattoes used this opening to petition for full rights equal to whites in their *Cahier des gens de couleurs*<sup>5</sup>, which they presented to the French National Assembly. As Dupuy explains, the mulattoes were not an integral part of the revolution, they were merely seeking a means to secure and better their position as landowners and slave owners. The position of the whites however, was dependent on the subjugation of blacks and was threatened by any equality given to even the Mulatto class. By 1791, tensions were running higher than ever on several fronts: white plantation owners were threatened by the mulattoes appeal for full rights, France was fighting Spain and England, and the slave uprising

<sup>4</sup> Literal translation : 'people of color', but meaning 'free people of color'

<sup>5</sup> In May of 1791, the National Assembly voted to give full citizenship to gens de couleurs with two free parents. This angered the whites and sparked more fighting and revolts on the island.

began to gain full force in the North of Haiti. The white planters staged an ultimatum to France, either uphold the institution of slavery and the subordination of the Mulatto class or they would defect (as the U.S. had from Great Britain). Unable to come to an acceptable compromise, the planters and many Mulattos defected to Great Britain on the agreement that they would take control and uphold slavery. Meanwhile, Toussaint Louverture and other leaders from the slave rebellion joined the Spanish army, waiting to rejoin with the French once they met their demands of full emancipation. Once the French ceded to their requests, Louverture and his troops joined the French to expel the British and the Spanish. Using this carefully orchestrated strategy, Louverture and his generals then were subsequently able to expel the French from the island.

By 1800, Louverture's forces numbered 20,000 and he had begun to stabilize his hold on the entirety of Haiti, with the goal of establishing a completely independent nation. His leadership was majority black, with some mulatto and very few whites. By 1801, Louverture had sent a letter to Napoleon declaring Haiti's independence, and had instituted a new constitution. The constitution established Louverture as the head of a military dictatorship and attempted to maintain the essential characteristics of a plantation economy, with former slaves working under similar conditions as slavery in order to uphold the level of production that was so lucrative for former white planters. However, with out any means to uphold the labor of former slaves, many resisted through escape or violence, and Louverture's leadership struggled with finding a way to provide incentives for former slaves to return to work.

Official independence was gained in 1804, with leadership now under Jean-Jacques Dessalines, Louverture having been betrayed and dispatched. Dupuy expands that "Whereas Louverture made the class question primary in his dealings with the French, Dessalines reversed the priorities and made the race question

paramount ideologically and politically."<sup>6</sup> (76) Yet despite his efforts class distinctions prevailed, and politically the nation remained divided between the *anciens libres* and *nouveaux libres*<sup>7</sup>. The *anciens libres*, many of who were western educated and followed French customs to maintain control over the coffee industry, the only industry that didn't suffer after the rupture of the revolution. This polarization as well as the discontent of many military leaders eventually manifested in a physical split of Haiti between the north and south, with the North dominated by Black leadership and militarized agrarianism of Christophe, and the South controlled by Mulatto elites under Pétion. Eventually, by 1820, Haiti was unified once again under the Mulatto elite with Pétion's successor, Jean-Pierre Boyer.

For the first time, Haiti was unified and fighting had subsided; yet now external forces would test Haiti by impeding its path to economic success, Haiti began to face international rejection of its sovereignty. It was notably invalidated by the Vatican, recognition that Haiti desperately needed in order to set up a viable schooling system<sup>8</sup>. Haiti was also diplomatically isolated during the 1825 Congress of Panama by other island nations and the U.S., which still depended heavily on slavery. Finally, without any allies and barred from trade, Haiti eventually ceded to the French Indemnity which demanded 150 million francs<sup>9</sup> from Haiti for the France's loss of property and as an entry fee to foreign trade. Without any options, Haiti was obliged to take loans from France itself and other merchants in order to pay its debt to France. The indemnity was paid for through heavy taxation of the peasantry and poor farmers. Although Haiti was now independent, it struggled to maintain its former levels of production without its plantation economy structure and without its links to international commerce via white plantation owners and negotiators. As such Haiti began to rely more and more upon the support of wealthy white merchants and loans.

The peasantry, divided mostly by color distinctions continued to be

<sup>7</sup>Dessalines did so by ensuring the elimination of whites from the island, requiring that citizenship be dependent on identification as person of color, and attempting to diminish racial distinction through colorism by mandating that all citizens identify as 'Black' only. (1804 Constitution)

<sup>8</sup>*Anciens Libres* : Blacks freed prior to the Revolution, including the gens de couleurs. *Nouveaux Libres* : Blacks freed during the Revolution.

<sup>9</sup>Comparable to 40 billion dollars adjusted to 2010's inflation

exploited in various ways through heavy taxation and *corvée*<sup>10</sup>, or forced labor for years to come. Clientelism became a ruling characteristic of the Haitian government, with dictatorialness and militarism as defining features. In this environment, political power became one of the sole means of wealth acquisition due to lack of economic opportunity at the national level. Factions would compete with each other, promising benefits of wealth to their supporters, despite the fact that the factions themselves may have had few differences politically. These divisions were expressed via different members of the mulatto bourgeoisie gaining followers from groups of Black peasants hoping for opportunity. In conjunction with these divisions, there were also several grassroots groups of Haitian peasants fighting for reparations for France's indemnity and land reform through fair redistribution. Yet, despite the existence of small peasant resistance groups, there was no all-encompassing mobilization of the peasant class against the minority ruling elite, no political confrontation of the masses against the privileged few. Trouillot explains that the dearth of strong political institutions led to the normalization of faction rivalries and coups as *de facto* politics for Haitian citizens. This led little room for true expression of political ideologies.

In summation, Haiti's government resembled a presidential monarchy, or an elective monarchy, in which ostensibly elected leaders commanded disproportionately large amounts of power and ruled with impunity. From Toussaint's time to the 1900s leaders were consistently validated and legitimized through military prowess and force. In the theoretical chapter I will further address theories of the development of Haitian statehood and its political institutions and how the presidency in Haiti today still resembles a presidential monarchy. The vital takeaways from the historical foundations of Haiti's nationhood are the internal divisions between the peasantry and the elite, the power imbalance between the mulattos and Blacks, the crippling debt and stagnating economy, reliance on foreign loans and aid, and the

political precedence of clientelism and coups. These themes and trends continue to plague Haiti today, and have effects on the government's stability as well as international exchanges. This historical legacy is an important foundation as I begin to explore the role of elections and politics in Haiti today.

### *Contemporary Haiti (1915-present)*

From the late 1800s to the early 1900s the Haitian bourgeoisie was at the helm of the distribution and exchange of products and dominated the Haitian economy. The absence of a strong agricultural sector, the ever-growing debt, and increasing reliance on foreign support meant that the primary means of wealth accumulation was now based in the circulation and distribution of goods. Meanwhile, what remained of Haiti's foreign debt increased more than six fold from 1875 to 1910. Politically, during this time Haiti jolted from regime to regime with a total of 24 different governments, 16 of which were toppled by coup d'états. Racial tensions exacerbated Haiti's internal tumult. While the country was not divided strictly along color lines (light-skinned clairs or mulattos and dark skinned noirs), the vast majority of mulattos were of a higher social class than the noirs. (Trouillot, 120)

Additionally, the notion of inequality being rooted in unequal land distribution has been widely theorized and is pertinent to Haiti's historical and pervasive inequality. Alexis de Tocqueville theorizes a poor agrarian economy as a precursor to the kind of inequality characteristic of Haiti: "When the possession of land or the right to the produce of the land is the main source of status, income, and wealth, inequality in land is equivalent to inequality in the distribution of political resources." (Dahl, 54)

Moreover, Haiti's economic instability and rampant clientelism resulted

<sup>10</sup>Literal Translation : chore

<sup>4</sup>Literal translation : 'people of color', but meaning 'free people of color'

<sup>5</sup>In May of 1791, the National Assembly voted to give full citizenship to gens de couleurs with two free parents. This angered the whites and sparked more fighting and revolts on the island.

in regimes supplicating foreign powers for aid and for assistance in overthrowing political rivals. Some regimes would appeal to the French, while others would seek support from the British or the United States. Haitian elites also had ties to German merchants who owned firms surpassing America's. In 1915, the United States capitalized completely on Haiti's instability by invading and establishing an occupation that would last 19 years. The United States took these measures as a means to represent their interests when Haiti refused to meet several economic and fiscal demands.<sup>11</sup> The U.S. enactment of the occupation came following a bloody coup in which members of the outgoing government were murdered and dismembered and the presumed leader of the insurrection was allegedly anti-American. The U.S. intervened before this leader, Dr. Rosalvo Bobo, could come to power and further disengage their hold on the Haitian economy. The occupation, occurring during the onset of WWI, was also a way to negate the German's influence on Haitian politics and economics.

The occupation established a puppet President and enacted an accord that would grant them 10 years of the right to "police the country and control public finances." (Trouillot, 101) After 2 years and several attempted insurgences, the U.S. extended its control of Haiti to 20 years. Resistance to the occupation endured until 1920. The overall effects of the occupation included a stabilization of Haitian currency, and a temporary reduction in corruption and coups, more centralization and homogenization, and also a severe depletion of economic capital and funds due to a focus on overcoming Haiti's debt above all else. The emphasis on centralized development would prove to be extremely damaging, exacerbating urbanization and further concentrating wealth among the elites. According to Trouillot, the U.S. worsened Haiti's economic situation by expanding its reliance on coffee exports, by raising the state's share of imports and exports through customs legislation,

<sup>10</sup>The Macdonald railroad company wanted the Haitian government to pay the interest on the cost of railroad construction in Haiti and the U.S. (through the Banque Nationale) wanted to commandeer Haitian fiscal regulation by controlling the issuance of paper money and customs.

implementing higher taxations on the peasantry, and by depleting Haiti's gold reserve. The economic consequences of the occupation were equally as detrimental as the political effects, which served to concentrate political and social capital to a smaller share of the population.

Both Trouillot and Dupuy indicate the end of the occupation as the beginning of new power struggle, in which factions and elite groups used different ideological narratives to occupy the political vacuum left by the United States. The presidencies of the occupation were mostly assumed by upper class light-skinned Haitian elites, who operated under the thumb of American interests, and in the U.S.'s absence the call to Black Power flourished. The Black Nationalist movements of Haiti were timely, sandwiched between the francophone literary movement *Négritude*<sup>12</sup> of the 1930s, and the U.S. Black Power movement of the 1950s and 1960s. Color distinctions and class distinctions now played a more critical role in political camps, as the unresolved tensions exacerbated by the U.S. occupations came to a head. Dupuy describes the two main groups that came to the fore, "one coalition was the forces that wanted to create a democratic government that would safeguard civil liberties, and the other, more conservative, represented the aspirations of the black nationalists to capture political power." (Dupuy, 149) With the rise of the intellectualization of the importance of color distinction, suspicions of *politique de doublure*<sup>13</sup> (i.e. where mulattoes front a black for office but continue to rule behind the scenes) were also invoked.

Despite the diverse ideologies and nationalistic fervor that dominated public and political discourse, few progressive changes were solidified into legislation. Governments and presidencies during the 40s and 50s met calamitous ends and fell prey to the same corruption and mismanagement of that typified Haitian government in the previous century. Running on a Black Nationalist platform,

<sup>12</sup> Literary and ideological philosophy, founded by Martinican poet Aimé Césaire, Léopold Senghor, and Léon Damas who sought to reappropriate the word *Nègre* to express a positive and affirmative experience of Blackness.

<sup>13</sup> Literal translation : Understudy policy



Francois Duvalier won the presidency in 1957, and proceeded to establish a dictatorship that would plunge Haiti into an era of unmatched violence, poverty, and misery. Duvalier's regime began with a brutal purge of his political opposition. Not only were his political adversaries eradicated, but the masses were largely silenced as well. These assassinations extended to his oppositions' family, friends and associates. Duvalier also ousted all foreign members of the Catholic Church and replaced them with Haitians. All forms of communication, unions, educational institutions, and publications were censored. Haiti's governing bodies were brought under direct control of Duvalier and a ruthless civilian militia, called the Tontons Macoutes. While Duvalier subjugated the mulatto bourgeoisie, he secured power for the black bourgeoisie but did not instigate any economic or social reforms that would benefit the peasantry. Instead taxes were once again increased on the agrarian class as a means of wealth extraction. Ten million dollars per year was alleged to have been withdrawn from the public treasury by Duvalier and his affiliates.

Taking the Presidential Monarchy to a new level, constitutional amendments provided for the lifelong duration Duvalier's presidency and for the succession of his son, Jean-Claude, to the presidency at only 19 years of age after his father's death. Meanwhile, international agencies, France, and the U.S. pushed manufacturing as a solution to Haitian underdevelopment. This however did not resolve Haiti's economic straits but deepened the gap in poverty levels between urban workers and farm workers and led to over-farming, dire deforestation and soil erosion. Notably, during this period the Duvaliers met little censure from the international community, who continued to trade and support Haiti through various development measures. After some time, the U.S. could no longer ignore Haiti's worsening state, nor the unlawful rule of the Duvalier Dictatorship, and in 1986 removed Duvalier from power, instating the Conseil National de Gouvernement (CNG), a military

civilian group to take charge.

The power vacuum left behind by the Duvalier dictatorship offered the once in a lifetime opportunity for the flourishing of political ideology and opened democratic contestation for the first time in decades. Despite initial setbacks in the establishment of institutions to provide for fair elections, this was a truly unique time in Haiti's history. The CNG, though corrupt, created the 1987 Haitian Constitution, and established the first elections, which were widely decried as a sham. The election that took place in 1987 was violent, with the Tontons Macoutes killing 22 voters. The massacre invalidated the results and prompted the U.S. to withdraw all support from the CNG with fair elections as a precondition to the renewal of aid. (Dupuy, 196) The next election in 1988 had a turnout of less than 10 percent. Leslie F. Manigat was given the presidency as he was deemed the acceptable choice by the CNG, and was supported by the Reagan administration.<sup>14</sup> Finally, by 1990, the will to hold elections was realized with what was deemed the first fair and legitimate Haitian elections to be held in recent history, with a sweeping victory for Jean-Bertrand Aristide.

Since the fall of Duvalierism there has been considerable debate as to the legitimacy of Haitian elections. Many of the elections from the late 1980s until today have been contested for their low turnout, violent repression, and exclusion of political parties. Under the guise of transparent elections, it could be argued that competitive clientelism and presidential monarchy is still the reigning form of government (to a greater or lesser degree depending on the President in office), and that parties use the presidency as a means to grasp at capital. However, many international institutions and nations including the U.S. and France believe that supporting Haiti's elections is one of the best ways to further Haitian development and democracy. Is foreign aid really helping the Haitian government develop accountability and create lasting democracy? From a historical perspective, where

<sup>14</sup> Manigat's role as President was later invalidated by the CEP and he was barred from running in the 1990 elections

Haiti's continued reliance on aid is the result of a Western imperialist legacy, the answer is no. My theoretical framework bolsters this view by putting Haiti's history and future paths toward development in perspective. Yet, it can only account for what is deemed Official Development Aid or Bilateral Aid, and fails to account for covert assistance, which has been significant in Haiti. Looking more deeply at the role of foreign actors through not only imperialism and aid donations, but also obfuscated covert actions, reveals a more troubling and complicated narrative.

### *Haiti, the Earthquake and Moving Forward*

I did not mention the disastrous effects of the earthquake that hit Haiti on January 12, 2010 in the previous chapter because it represents a monumental tragedy in Haiti's history that is in a league of its own. The earthquake had a magnitude of 7.0 Mw with an epicenter about 16 miles west of Port-au-Prince. In someplace like Japan or New Zealand, a 7.0 Mw earthquake is disastrous but the institutions exist to ensure speedy rescues, services to the injured and general recovery efforts. In Haiti, the magnitude, the centralized damage and the lack of institutions and public services enormously exacerbated an already tragic event. The Haitian government puts the earthquake death toll at 316,000 and other groups have placed it in the 200,000s (O'Conner).

The earthquake had adverse effects on all areas of Haitian life, and most of the damage remains unresolved more than 6 years later. The recovery efforts of NGOs and foreign governments in Haiti are perhaps the leading example worldwide of the failures of the modern aid system and deficiencies of global civil society. According to the Associated Press, "for every one dollar of U.S. aid to Haiti, 42 cents is for disaster assistance, 33 cents is for the U.S. military, 9 cents is for food, 9 cents is to transport

the food, 5 cents to pay Haitians to help with recovery effort, 1 cent is for the Haitian government and ½ a cent is for the government of the Dominican Republic" (Quigley) Additionally, the Red Cross faced significant scrutiny after it was reported that of the 255 million dollars it raised in donations, just 106 million dollars made it to Haiti. (Quigley)

The head of the UN Mission in Haiti at the time of the earthquake estimated there to be over 10,000 NGOs operating in Haiti even before the natural disaster, and none of these organizations coordinated with the government of Haiti in a successful way to address reconstruction at a unified and national level. Instead, lack of oversight led to piecemeal efforts that led mostly nowhere. The lack of accountability of NGOs in this crisis and in Haiti in general has in recent years been decried more publicly. Awareness of the failures of aid and NGOs has become more prominent within the global collective consciousness, but it has yet to produce any concrete amelioration for the Haitian state. Although disaster relief aid works a bit differently from bilateral aid that is earmarked directly for elections, the general climate of aid and global civil society groups in Haiti is one of irresponsibility, disorganization, and obfuscation. (Edmonds)

### *Aid Frameworks and Implications*

Today's aid structure finds its roots in the aftermath of World War II, as organizations were founded to foster the rehabilitation of European nations. The Marshall Plan was the foremost of these aid initiatives, in which the United States gave roughly 130 billion dollars<sup>15</sup>, to Western Europe. The plan was largely successful and has since become the genesis and justification for several other incarnations of aid initiatives. (Ehrenfeld)

<sup>15</sup> Adjusted to current dollar value

The contemporary landscape of aid is complex and populated with a wide range of programs and institutions. When I speak about aid as it pertains to Haitian development, my definition will encompass a broad range of funding sources, but primarily addresses bilateral aid from USAID and NGOs to an extent. Aid generally speaking refers to Multilateral and Bilateral Official Development Aid (ODA). Multilateral ODA<sup>16</sup> is a process by which recipient countries receive funding from multiple governments or donor sources through a mediating multilateral organization. Some examples of Multilateral Aid Organizations include the UN, the World Health Organization (WHO), the World Bank (WB), and the International Monetary Fund (IMF). In 2013, multilateral aid totaled 41 billion dollars. Bilateral ODA<sup>17</sup> is provided by donor countries and given directly to developing countries. Non-Core Funding can also come from donors to be channeled through organizations for a specific purpose or region.

Bilateral ODA is generally organized by the Development Assistant Committee (DAC) of the OECD. In 2013, the total amount of Bilateral ODA came to a total of 85.9 billion dollars. USAID is one of the largest Bilateral Aid Organizations, and is one of the major contributors to Haitian development aid. In this paper when discussing aid in the specific context of elections, the aid I refer to is generally Bilateral ODA from the United States through USAID, Bilateral ODA from France and Canada (the other major aid donors in Haiti), and multilateral aid from organizations like the UN through programs such as United Nations Stabilization Mission In Haiti (Mission des Nations Unies pour la stabilisation en Haïti, (MINUSTAH)). I am also only referring to aid that could be designated as non-Core funding because it is given with the specific purpose to support elections and has certain sanctions attached to its use.

<sup>16</sup>Core funding

<sup>17</sup>Or non-core funding

# 3

## Theoretical Analysis

30 *Theorizing Democratic Ideals*

34 *The Haitian State & Democracy*

37 *Pessimist and Optimist Viewpoints*

### *Theorizing Democratic Ideals as They Pertain to Development*

Has democracy always been the ideal form of government, and why is democracy valued today as the normative form of representation within a nation? Amartya Sen<sup>18</sup> is one of many economists and theorists who believe that While democracy is not yet universally practiced, nor indeed universally accepted, in the general climate of world opinion democratic governance has achieved the status of being taken to be generally right.” (Sen, *Journal of Democracy*, 3-17) Yet, the climate of world opinion is rarely unanimous and the historical trajectory leading to today’s global democratic leanings has not been a straight line. Francis Fukuyama argues a more complex history of democratization in his book, ‘The Origins of Political Order’:

The doctrine of universal recognition on which liberal democracy is based points backward to earlier stages of political development in which societies were more equal and open to broad participation. I noted that hunter-gatherer and tribal societies were far more egalitarian and participatory than the state-level societies that replaced them. Once the principle of equal respect or dignity is articulated, it is hard to prevent human beings from demanding it for themselves. This perhaps helps to explain the seemingly inexorable spread of the notion of human equality in the modern world that was noted by Tocqueville in *Democracy in America*.

(Fukuyama, 479)

Numerous philosophers and sociologists dating back to Athenian Greece, where the term first appeared, have theorized democracy. The first formally recorded democracy, established by Cleisthenes in 508 BC, was a system of government in which a minority of eligible citizens<sup>19</sup> participated in an assembly where laws were set. In this system citizens had direct access to lawmaking through forums, but thousands of variations on this system of

<sup>18</sup>Nobel Prize winning economist and philosopher

<sup>19</sup>non-foreign male landowners

democratic representation have since coalesced. As the diversity in models of representation and government has grown, so too have theoretical ideations of what constitutes the ideal form of government. The theories that will be relevant to a contemporary understanding of democracy (as will be pertinent to Haiti’s development) include Schumpeter’s criterion of competitive selection of political leaders and Dahl’s polyarchy and metagame of transition to democracy. These theoretical frameworks form the foundation from which I will examine two opposing theoretical camps concerning the function of elections.

Schumpeter’s 1976 work, *Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy*, theorizes that democracy is not rule by the people, but rule by politicians, also called elite pluralism. Therefore, the Schumpeterian criteria for a true democracy includes the following: the people’s selection of politicians should be competitive and fair, the politicians running should be of high quality and diverse ideologies, and there should be a professional bureaucracy to preserve a high-functioning government despite changes in leadership. Under these qualifiers, it would be fair to argue that Haiti is a democratic nation in name only, particularly considering the corruption within the bureaucracy, the historically flawed election process, and the barriers politicians and parties face. These qualifiers also tie closely to Dahl’s theories of polyarchy and the prerequisites for successful transition toward democracy, which will aid in understanding the role of elections in Haiti’s transition toward democracy. (Schumpeter)

Robert A. Dahl, theorizes democracy in his seminal 1971 work, *Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition*, as a set of conditions to be met or judged according to a bilateral scale. In his work, polyarchy is the term used to represent what we consider modern day democracies, defined as governments in which power is invested in multiple people, a step removed from a theoretically

ideal democracy. The conditions of a true democracy include the rights of citizens to 1) formulate preferences, 2) signify preferences to other citizens and the government, and 3) have preferences weighed without discrimination within the government. (Dahl) The dimensions on which Dahl scales democracy are public contestation and inclusiveness. Public contestation is defined as the limit to which public and political opposition is permitted and inclusiveness is the extent to which citizens are able to participate in the political sphere. Most governments can be judged along these two dimensions<sup>20</sup>. Any movement towards greater inclusiveness or greater opportunity for public contestation represents a transition towards greater democracy, which is assumed to be desirable.

The assumptions for the desirability of a polyarchy are both theoretical and realistic. Countries that move along the scale of inclusiveness and public contestation towards polyarchy afford citizens greater opportunities to protest unequal treatment in their regime. Greater suffrage and representation within the government also leads to a more accurate “composition of political leadership.” (Dahl) Greater representation and freedom to express and shape political thought within a nation is generally superior to a repressive regime in which a privileged minority is in complete control. The less opportunity for public contestation and the less inclusive the regime, the more likely a dangerous faction or tyrannical leader is able to monopolize and dominate the political arena. This can lead to various forms of social, political, and economic oppression.

Fair and free elections are a major indicator of democracy on both the public contestation and inclusiveness vectors. Elections provide openings for public contestation by serving as an outlet for dissenting opinions and competition for representation within the government. When universal suffrage is a feature of elections it is indicative of a more inclusive regime. Moreover,

<sup>20</sup>Visualization for Dahl’s dimensions of democracy in Fig. 3




Fig 3

many democracy indexes use the transparency, regularity, and inclusiveness of elections as major indicators in their ranking systems. As such, free and fair elections remain one of the foremost indicators of a successful transition toward democracy, while also serving as a tool in democracy promotion. However, there is considerable debate as to how this process should transpire. Are elections as a tool in democracy building and development only valid and effective if they unfold naturally and intrinsically from the population itself? Or can they be positively shaped with foreign aid and other incentives?

## *The Haitian State & Democracy*

But if democracy is the ideal format for governance, why is Haiti not converging towards democracy on its own volition, and why are the current development measures not working more effectively? If it is in the people's best interest to live in a country of democratic principles, why has there been little progress within Haiti's political environment within the past 100 years? Fukuyama notes of the desire to hasten the democratization of developing nations; "everyone would like to figure out how to transform Somalia, Haiti, Nigeria, Iraq, or Afghanistan into "Denmark," and the international development community has long lists of presumed Denmark-like attributes that they are trying to help failed states achieve." However, in rushing towards the hypothetical ideal of a modern state, the international development community tends to harbor "historical amnesia", where a successful country's evolution is often overlooked. (Fukuyama, 15)

He notes for example that the state of Denmark's precursor was the tribal Vikings, then the "Germanic barbarian" groups that eventually developed into political institutions with centralized sources of authority and defined territorial boundaries. This led to the modern day notion of statehood with the introduction of formal laws. For other countries, democracy was attained through the increased limitation of monarchical power, where the Royals slowly faced greater restraints on their impunity through laws, parliament, and other bodies, until (as in many constitutional monarchies and democracies today), the King or Queen became little more than a symbolic figurehead. Each purportedly 'democratic' nation today has a uniquely complex historical path. Today the international development community has attempted to circumscribe the process

of democratization to a set of actions that can be applied unilaterally to all developing nations, ignoring the fact that each nation's transition is uniquely endemic to its culture and political evolution.

While democracy can perhaps be lauded as an ideal form of government, its successful establishment is highly dependent on the history that precedes it. This concept, also called 'path dependence' by Dahl and others, amounts broadly to understanding the significance of the historical path leading up to a present state. The reasons for the lack of gains in equality within the political process in Haiti today are path dependent on the development of the Haitian state. Haiti was founded without formal ties or promises of adhering to democratic ideals. First and foremost, Haiti was launched into nationhood through a militaristic uprising, setting the precedent for the dynamics of the acquisition of political power. Haiti's first formal Constitution written in 1805 more clearly evinces Haiti's historical rootedness in the military. The document divides Haiti into six military divisions (all under the greater leadership of the Emperor and Commander in Chief of the Army, Jacques Dessalines) through which basic social and municipal functions operate. It also establishes a leadership that verges on monarchist in nature, conferring the "title of Majesty" upon the Emperor of Haiti, as well as establishing him as "sacred and inviolable." Although the position of emperor was to be "elective, not hereditary", the model for Haiti's origins cannot be considered traditionally democratic. (1805 Constitution)

The United States can serve as a point of comparison to Haiti in democracy building. Both nations were former colonies. Both nations were originally structured and built via a plantation economy. The United States, however, was founded in extreme opposition to the monarchy that ruled it, and

was built with a constitution that upheld theoretical democratic ideals, even if they were flagrantly ignored in practice. This foundation of democracy on paper allowed for struggles for abolition and full suffrage to take place later in history. However, Haiti was formed through a military revolution where the stakes were freedom itself, as opposed to ideological and financial independence. Haiti had no need to restructure the basic monarchist framework of the French, which in reality was also more aligned with notions of pre-colonial African political formations and were probably more familiar to the former slaves.

Since the 1805 Constitution of Ayiti, there have been 22 new constitutions, often drastically altered to meet the whims of whichever autocrat controlled the state at the time. This is once again a consequence of competitive clientelism that excludes the masses from the governing process. So, what will it take for the masses to become involved in politics in a meaningful way that will allow Haiti to break out of its presidential monarchist framework? The news covering today's elections crisis shows no lack of citizens' desire for political inclusion, so why has progress been so stagnant? The reality is that as long as poverty and inequality remain as drastic as they are, politics will continue to be a fight for economic gain. A poor voter has little incentive to vote based on ideology when a party can promise to give them a surreptitious handout for their vote or for their participation in the sabotage of an opposing party. These tactics are how elections are won in Haiti. Many recognize these harrowing circumstances and, in protest, refuse to participate in politics and elections at all. With these circumstances in mind, it's easy to see why wealthy nations and aid organizations might attempt to offer Haiti assistance. But is more assistance the solution to a Haiti's political ills, or is it merely exacerbating the problem?

## *Pessimist and Optimist Viewpoints; Understanding Aid and Elections in the Transition Towards Democracy*

As a government moves toward a democratic ideal, there are several processes and institutions that can promote or hinder this transition. Dahl postulates that a major impediment to the transition can come in the form of the incumbent regime's desire to maintain control. He theorizes this process through the metagame of transition with five main axioms. Axioms 4 and 5 are particularly relevant to Haiti's current transition towards greater democratic transparency and the consequences of its reliance on foreign aid. (Dahl, Polyarchy)

*Axiom 4. The likelihood that a government will tolerate an opposition increases as the resources available to the government for suppression decline relative to the resources of an opposition.*

*Axiom 5. The likelihood that a government will tolerate an opposition increases with a reduction in the capacity of the government to use violence or socioeconomic sanctions to suppress an opposition.*

Following Axiom 4, if aid is given to an incumbent government, this aid can be used to fund measures of suppression against any opposing political groups and to ensure the continued political power of the incumbent. This outcome can be mitigated through specific measures like oversight committees and sanctions to ensure aid ends up at its intended destination. However, written sanctions can often be intentionally misinterpreted or skewed to the regime's benefit. So, how does foreign and international aid promote elections and democracy without simply enabling an incumbent regime to consolidate more power? Does the overall positive effect of aid for democracy development overcome the negative effects of an incumbent's use of aid for purposes of power consolidation?



Following Dahl's argument to its conclusion, foreign aid is detrimental to the recipient country's governmental accountability and transparency because the regime will use those resources to suppress its opposition. In *Democratization by Elections; a New Mode of Transition*, Ellen Lust-Okar expands upon the consequences of aid in Dahl's metagame of transition. She explains, "despite several electoral cycles and formal rules guaranteeing competition, autocrats in many countries have been skillful in handling the strategic interaction in the electoral arena so as to prevent opposition parties from changing the fundamental parameters of the regime-game." (Lindberg, 332)

The ways in which incumbent regimes handle "the strategic interaction" include nepotism and clientelism, instating biased electoral law, and using aid resources to promote the domination of their party and shut down political contestation. I will provide specific examples of these practices in action in Haiti in the following chapter. These methods turn what should be fair competition in Schumpeter's elite pluralism into competitive clientelism. Overall, Lust-Okar's argument that foreign aid and elections do not inherently promote democracy can be labeled the 'pessimist view.' (Lindberg)

Lust-Okar goes on to explain that "generally, the very support that the international community gives to incumbent elites following the initiation or expansion of elections will also keep them in power." (Lindberg, 245) This is because regimes that are hegemonic, or not fully democratized, use elections as a way for elite groups to secure resources and deliver them to their supporters. When aid serves as a constant influx of resources, the incumbent will use those resources to bolster the hegemony of which they are at the helm. This reflects the statements purported in Axioms 4 and 5. However, some would argue that the pessimist viewpoint is incomplete because it does not consider the long-term,

cumulative effects of elections in building democracy.

In contrast to the pessimist view, many theorists postulate that despite incumbents' ability to suppress opposition, elections are intrinsically democratizing with repetition. In other words, despite unfair elections, continued and timely elections tend to produce a positive net effect. This stance can be labeled the 'optimist view.' (Lindberg) Jan Teorell and Axel Hadenius describe two theories explaining the ways in which positive effects of imperfect elections can be expressed. The first interpretation is called 'mouse nibbling' in which elections reduce inequalities with each election leading to greater levels of democracy over time and after repeated elections. The other metaphor is 'the pressure chamber', where successive elections create a cumulative effect that creates a bursting pressure for democracy, resulting in a "real democratic breakthrough" despite little evidence of progress during the buildup. They continue to support the "view taken by the 'optimists'" using findings from a study examining the cumulative effects of democratic elections on the Freedom House civil liberties ratings. (Lindberg) Their results show evidence of small positive short-term effects of elections and positive long-term effects of elections with a decreasing marginal utility of elections.

While perhaps in the long run, repetitive elections are positive, I believe the pessimist view is a more realistic and productive analysis of elections. Lust-Okar is not arguing that elections have no bearing on democracy, but that an election in an authoritarian regime in which elites monopolize political, economic and social capital, is not conducive to promoting democracy. When elections are easily co-opted by ruling elites they do not serve as a path to democracy. Consequently, in such regimes, aid from the international community only propagates these inequalities and undermines the democratic gains that

elections could otherwise provide. The pessimist view pertains to Haiti because a hegemonic ruling elite dominates its government, where aid has traditionally been used as a resource to maintain the incumbent's political stronghold.

On Dahl's scale of public contestation and inclusiveness, Haiti's government would probably be somewhere near the area identified in figure 2, close to what Dahl labels an inclusive hegemony. This is because while Haiti affords universal suffrage and opportunities to participate in elections and other governmental activities to many competing groups of elites, there is less public contestation. Political competition and permissible opposition is far less




Fig. 4

tolerated, evinced by the frequent violence or systematic dismantling of opposing parties and factions by incumbent leaders. Haiti's low voter turnout and voter disenfranchisement are other consequences of the government's failure to ensure

the freedom to publicly express dissent. Moving towards greater liberalization and freedom of political contestation would mean that elections and representation would be more competitive and therefore more reflective of the electorate's wants.

This positioning mirrors the results of global freedom and democracy indexes that place Haiti somewhere between freedom and partial freedom, and democracy and oppression. These indexes use various indicators like civil liberties, electoral law, freedom for political parties, freedoms for cultural or ethnic groups and more. Based on these indicators, the Freedom House labels Haiti "partly free" with a score of 5 out of 7<sup>21</sup> on political rights, freedom, and civil liberties. The Global Democracy Ranking gave Haiti the rank of 104 in 2013<sup>22</sup>. Haiti has a far way to come in terms of political and civil rights, and one of the main ways this can be accomplished is through greater development and improvement to its elections and electoral law, and further transparency within its governing bodies.

In order to move Haiti towards greater inclusiveness and opportunity for public contestation, elections should certainly be promoted and emphasized. However, promotion of free and fair elections needs to emerge from within Haiti without the influence of foreign aid and intervention. As long as foreign aid is given to Haiti to promote fair elections, the incumbent regime is likely to continue to use the resources provided to foster their own growth and exclude opposing parties. When the incumbent is starved for resources, "voters and candidates may defect, and the elections become much more contested." (Lindberg) In Haiti, the consequences of foreign aid have already manifested through rampant clientelism, exclusion of opposing parties through electoral law, minimized opportunities to dissent due to threats of violence, and a disenfranchisement of the electorate. These consequences counteract the benefits

<sup>21</sup> where 1 is free and 7 is unfree

<sup>22</sup> Norway was ranked at 1 and the Syrian Arab Republic was ranked 114

elections could provide to Haiti's development.

Within the greater discourse of global development efforts however, political pundits are unlikely to support the pessimist view. Global civil society and international groups like the IMF or the UN have missions to support nations like Haiti, and the main way they do so is through monetary support and aid measures. If they adopted rhetoric that supported the pessimist view, it would invalidate their efforts and consequently their authority and influence. The optimist view instead supports their continued efforts to acquire donations without requiring aid groups to be retrospectively measured as to their efficacy and then held accountable to their success or failure. Although subtracting foreign aid from the elections equation does not ensure transparency and accountability in the Haitian government, it will be a step in the direction of greater democracy and equality.

# 4

## How Elections Work in Haiti

47 *Dangerous Precedence*

55 *The Michel Martelly Solution*

60 *Pattern Recognition*

Any evidence proving the benefits of the use of foreign aid in elections in Haiti is contradictory at best. It's unimaginable to think of how elections in Haiti could even be operational without foreign aid, and yet its efficacy remains unclear. For example, in 2015, USAID contributed over 16 million dollars in election aid to be implemented towards the CEP, voter education and integration, violence mitigation, training and advocating for more female candidates and participants. USAID's anticipated results were, among other goals, to "build the capacity of Haitian electoral authorities... to conduct elections that genuinely reflect the will of the Haitian people..." (USAID) The results of the first round of legislative elections in Haiti on August 9, 2015 paint a different picture. As reported by the Réseau National de Defense des Droits Humains (RNDDH), National Council of Electoral Observation (Conseil National d'Observation Electorale (CNO)) and the Haitian Council of Non-State Actors (Conseil Haïtien des Acteurs Non Etatiques (CONHANE)), not only were there widespread accounts of corrupt proceedings in the CEP leading up to the first election, but the election itself was marred with fraud and violence necessitating a re-run of elections in 25 precincts. Less than 10 percent of the candidates running were women despite a quota of 30 percent mandated by the Electoral Decree. (Haiti Elections Blog)

Initially, I was hoping to rely on the power of statistics and Haiti's historical election data to reveal a negative association between foreign aid disbursement and fair elections. However, Haiti's corruption and lack of governmental infrastructure is so pervasive that historical election results are difficult to access. Not to mention there is an abundance of retrospective analyses questioning the validity of electoral results, which led me to conclude

that an analysis of election results and aid disbursement might be less than constructive. Instead, to substantiate the claim that foreign aid has been a detriment to transparent Haitian elections, I will use evidence from the preceding election in 2011 and recently released data from the FOIA to confirm instances of international pressure to alter or obfuscate election results and incidents of dubious aid allocations. I will also employ contrasting narratives from Haitian and Western news sources covering the ongoing elections, the distressing indicators like low turnout and violence, and citizen complaints to demonstrate the disenfranchisement of the electorate as a result of corruption and interventionism.<sup>23</sup>

### *Dangerous Precedence; the 1990 elections in Haiti*

The 1990 elections were notable for several reasons. Most important, was that from the violence and insecurity of the preceding three years, arose the first fair and legitimate elections in Haiti. Additionally, the 1990 elections introduced Jean-Baptiste Aristide into the fore of international politics. Finally, it established the precedence of foreign intervention and aid in an election cycle that would be repeated to varying magnitudes for the next 26 years.

The 1990 elections ensued after the dissolution of the Duvalier Empire in 1986, and represented a time of both great political uncertainty and unparalleled hope for a legitimate democracy. Haitians had approved a new constitution in March of 1987 and set up a CEP, to oversee electoral procedures and create electoral law. However, the primary outcome of the 1987 elections was widespread violence, intimidation at the hands of the Macoutes, assassinations of key human rights activists, and pervasive death threats. Duvalier's former armed

<sup>23</sup> For a list of organizations and abbreviations of institutes see Appendix A

forces chief, General Henri Namphy, who had maintained control after the coup, canceled the 1987 elections after 34 people were killed at a polling station on the morning of Election Day. He called for elections to be held in January of the next year (NDI, 'The 1990 General Elections in Haiti', 44). Unsurprisingly, the 1988 elections were also a resounding failure as less than 5 percent of the population turned out to vote, due to botched attempts to address transparency issues that plagued the previous elections. Two more coups followed the 1988 elections. Finally, Ertha Pascal Trouillot, a Supreme Court judge, was appointed as Provisional President, and with the support of the UN and Organization of American States (OAS) established a new CEP and set up the 1990 elections timeline. At this juncture, the CEP constructed and revised Haiti's election law under the council of the OAS.

According to Henry F. Carey in Electoral Observation and Democratization in Haiti, "even though there was no formal authorization for a peacekeeping mission, UN security monitors were deployed alongside civilians from both the UN and the OAS." This established the first incidence of a "security and technical assistance mission in electoral observation history." Besides the UN and the OAS, the Carter Center and the National Democratic Institute for International Affairs (NDI) were also present in a joint effort for the purposes of mediation and electoral observation. The International Foundation for Electoral Systems (IFES) also was given a 1.8 million dollar grant from the USAID to provide "technical assistance and election commodity procurements for the 1990-91 election cycle." The IFES' role included ballot design, polling place configuration, vote counting, and civic education materials. (IFES Haitian Election Report)<sup>24</sup>

<sup>24</sup>Some of the materials from the 1990-91 elections are available in Appendix B

The unquestionable star of the 1990 elections was Jean-Baptiste Aristide, candidate for the National Front for Change and Democracy party (Front National pour le Changement et la Démocratie (FNCD)). He was thrust into the awareness of the greater international community through the highly covered elections, but his presence as an activist and party leader had already been established for many years. Aristide was one of the most vocal dissenters of the 1987 elections, citing foreign intervention as a deterrent to their legitimacy. He had also developed a following among the poor Haitian masses through his work in developing an orphanage and youth programs through his Ti Legliz<sup>25</sup> movement.

Mostly his opposition, candidates Marc Bazin, the choice of most international and US governmental bodies, and Roger Lafontant, former leader of the Tonton Macoutes<sup>26</sup>, prompted Aristide's entry in the 1990 elections. Bazin espoused centrist and conservative policies and Roger Lafontant, was invited to participate in the elections by the U.S., was situated at the far right. (Hallward, 31) Additionally, the U.S. government backed Bazin, who worked for the World Bank and used his ties to foreign investors as a pillar in his manifesto, with 36 million dollars in election aid. Neither of these front-runners had much popular support, so Aristide's entry into the race was a game changer that mobilized the people to action. The NDI report noted "the CEP reports suggest that within 48 hours after Father Aristide announced his candidacy, the number of registered voters in the slum neighborhoods of Port-au-Prince and other poor regions of the country doubled." (NDI, 'The 1990 General Elections in Haiti', 38) This perhaps more than anything demonstrates Aristide's popularity with the Haitian populace, and the hope that there would finally be a representative for the moun andeyò<sup>27</sup> in office.

<sup>25</sup>Translation : The 'little church' movement

<sup>26</sup>Reference to the Haitian 'boogeyman'. The uncle (tonton) who captures and punishes unruly children

<sup>27</sup>Literal translation : those outside. Referencing those living in the countryside, marginalized poor

It's ironic that while most electoral observational bodies laud the 1990 elections as being free and fair, there were notable interventions on behalf of the international community that attempted at several turns to both derail the culmination of Aristide's election to office and later discredit his presidency. For example, several sources have confirmed that Andrew Young, Jimmy Carter's assistant, was relegated with the task of attempting to convince Aristide to cede victory to Bazin on the night of his electoral victory, while maintaining the pretense of having a purely observational role in elections (Fatton, 'Haiti's Predatory Republic', 90). Jimmy Carter had been present throughout the 1990 elections as delegation leader to the Council of Freely-Elected Heads of Government of the United States, advocating to the Senate and House for increased aid donations, and undertaking election monitoring and mediation duties as an American figurehead. (NDI, 'The 1990 Elections in Haiti')

After Aristide's unfettered success was affirmed with 67.5 percent of the popular vote, the US was obliged to assume tepid support of the Aristide and Fanmi Lavalas<sup>28v</sup> administration despite its previous hopes for a Bazin presidency. There were divisions within the U.S. governmental branch; the leadership in the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) who still had great ties to the Bush administration was less accepting, and indeed suspicious and threatened by Aristide, while some members of Congress were quite favorable towards his leadership. Fatton describes Aristide's presidential term as a prophetic leader whose hopes for a populist, transformative revolution were tempered by constraints of conventional Haitian politicking; in other words, "his radical rhetoric had obdurate limits." (Fatton, 'Haiti's Predatory Republic', 80) However, Aristide's incendiary public speeches and policy goals (despite being modest) greatly threatened the Haitian elites and the Haitian army, who remained

<sup>28v</sup>Literal translation : the Waterfall/Flood Family. This is the new party that Aristide and his administration formed once he was elected. Aristide had officially run under the FNCD party.

tied to the Duvalierist leadership.

On September 27, 1991, two days before a coup would overthrow him and force him into exile for 3 years, President Aristide gave a highly controversial and famous speech titled 'Pe Lebrun' where he decried the bourgeoisie and insisted that the masses take action into their own hands. He denounced the elites indicating that the money they had was "earned in thievery... under an evil regime, an evil system." Then, addressing the people he encourages, "if you catch a thief, if you catch a false Lavalassian, if you catch a false... Don't hesitate to give him what he deserves." This speech was perhaps the tipping point in tensions that had been gradually building between the supporters of the Lavalas movement, and the threatened bourgeoisie. The coup took place two days later on September 29, 1991 led by Army General Raoul Cédras, Army Chief of Staff Phillipe Biamby, and Chief of the National Police, Michel François. (Whitney)

More than anything, the 1991 coup that followed Aristide's election became evidence of the dominant class's refusal to cede to the populist mandate. The prevalence of class power and class divisions superseded attempts at democracy at every turn and foreign aid commitments to supporting elections became a way of stockpiling the elites' arsenal. Additionally in the aftermath of the coup, led by General Raoul Cédras and other military leaders, the involvement of the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency in Haitian affairs was revealed. The New York Times and the LA Times reported "key members of the military regime who are now controlling Haiti and blocking Aristide's return from exile in the United States were paid by the CIA from the mid-1980s until at least the 1991 coup." And also that "a senior intelligence official gave a closed-door briefing to congressional leaders in which he suggested that Aristide is mentally unstable." (Mann, LA times) The New York Times cited that "one crucial

source of information for American intelligence over the years, according to two Government officials, was Lieut. Gen. Raoul Cédras, who leads the Haitian armed forces.” (Weiner, NY times) In fact, many of the men accused of being involved in the coup were revealed to have been members of the Haitian National Intelligence Service (Service d’Intelligence National (SIN)), who were trained and funded by the CIA for counter-narcotics and drug intelligence. The article further states, “It was a military organization that distributed drugs in Haiti,” said the official, who spoke on condition of anonymity. ‘It never produced drug intelligence. The agency gave them money under counter-narcotics and they used their training to do other things in the political arena.’” It is also of note that the agency’s deep involvement in Haiti follows a slew of disturbing involvement in elections and paramilitary groups in other Latin American and Caribbean countries under the Bush and Reagan administrations through the 80s. The covert funding of questionable groups in Latin America is part of a much larger narrative of anti-drug policy and covert action first championed under the Reagan administration.<sup>29</sup>

The U.S. denied any involvement in the coup and claimed that the agency stopped funding leaders like Cédras around the time of the coup. Aristide was evacuated with the assistance of U.S., French, and Venezuelan forces and was in exile for three years. During this time, the international community attempted to pressure the usurpers to relinquish control of Haiti through embargos and freezing financial assets, among other measures. Although a trade embargo against Haiti was instituted to pressure the junta, U.S. companies were given an exemption, and “more than 50 U.S. companies continue(d) to trade with Haiti.” (Hartman, Seattle Times) Additionally, in 1994, Clinton approved a 5 million dollar secret contingency plan that authorized the “Central Intelligence

<sup>29</sup>The Reagan-Contras Scandal: This refers to the role of the CIA in drug trafficking in Central America during the Reagan administration. Money from cocaine smuggling was used to fund the Contras, covertly U.S. backed right wing rebel groups in Nicaragua. Support for the Contras was condemned by Congress, but supported covertly by the CIA and the Reagan administration in the war against the Nicaraguan government. This scandal became the subject of many journalistic investigations as well as a CIA internal investigation

Agency to spend 1 million dollars on propaganda to help ease Father Aristide’s return.” (Sciolino, New York times) Finally, after failing to implement change through diplomacy, the US led a U.N. sanctioned mission “Operation Uphold Democracy” after the United Nations passed Security Council resolution 940. Below is an excerpt from the resolution authorizing force to restore Aristide to the presidency;

4. Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, authorizes Member States to form a multinational force under unified command and control and, in this framework, to use all necessary means to facilitate the departure from Haiti of the military leadership, consistent with the Governors Island Agreement, the prompt return of the legitimately elected President and the restoration of the legitimate authorities of the Government of Haiti, and to establish and maintain a secure and stable environment that will permit implementation of the Governors Island Agreement, on the understanding that the cost of implementing this temporary operation will be borne by the participating Member States;

(United Nations, ‘Security Council resolution 940’)

In Fatton’s view, the American led restoration of Aristide to the presidency deradicalized his platform and emasculated Aristide’s personhood and status. The reliance on the international community’s force to restore the legitimate leadership tainted Haiti’s sovereignty and marred Aristide’s image in the Haitian public opinion. However, the 1990 elections and resulting coup also evince the benefits of foreign presence in elections in developing countries. President Ertha Trouillot, charged with planning the elections as head of the CEP, requested significant aid because Haiti did not have the capacity to conduct elections without assistance. Additionally, election observers are able to give some credibility to elections through more sophisticated vote counting practices and training to Haitian voting monitors. However, where foreign intervention



often fails is in instances of mediation, like when former President Carter attempts to influence party leaders, or when certain leaders or agency assets receive disproportionate levels of funding. Unfortunately, it is unreasonable to assume that any country, especially the United States, gets involved in a developing nation for purely altruistic reasons, no matter how much they might insist otherwise (Mann, LA Times).

The legacy of the 1990 elections, and the tumultuous upheavals that followed, was the establishment of precedence for United States and international involvement in Haitian elections both overtly and covertly. The means by which Haitian politics were influenced ranged from electoral observation, advising and mediation, and aid donations to the logistical undertakings of an election cycle. The late eighties to the early nineties also serves as a prime example of not only the involvement of the US and international agencies in Haitian elections, but of the discordance between the will of the United State's covert action officials and the legislative branch. In some ways, the struggle for free elections in Haiti and other developing nations has simultaneously functioned as a battleground for policy skirmishes among the leaders of the United States. Because support for Haitian political leaders is given preferentially at the discretion of US policy makers who are often in disagreement, these internal power struggles within the US government only serve to further complicate and endanger the acrimonious conditions that already characterize Haitian elections.

Finally, these elections highlight the blurry line between aid and imperialism. Some of the foreign aid allocated to the 1990 elections was legitimate. However, aid that comes with strings attached can hardly be defined as aid in the true definition of the word. Aid is defined most simply as 'something (such as money, food, or equipment) that is given by a government

or an organization to help the people in a country or area where many people are suffering because of poverty, disease, etc.'<sup>30</sup> Yet, there is little doubt that imperialism, 'the policy or act of extending a country's power and influence through diplomacy and military control'<sup>31</sup> was at play in many of these measures.

### *The Michel Martelly Solution; the 2010-2011 elections in Haiti*

Twenty years after the 1990 elections, the same concerns continued to proliferate within the realm of electoral politics. In the twenty years leading up to the 2010 elections, there had been several transitions of leadership. As mentioned earlier, Aristide was reinstated in 1994, followed by Rene Preval's election in 1995 under Fanmi Lavalas, Aristide's re-election in 2000 under Fanmi Lavalas, and Rene Preval's re-election in 2006 under the Lespwa<sup>32</sup> party. After this long string of fairly leftist Presidents (although support for Aristide and Preval waned over the years) the 2010 elections brought about a drastically different President through suspect circumstances. Haiti's 2010 Presidential successor was Michel Martelly, an unlikely candidate best known in Haiti for his musical repertoire as the konpa<sup>33</sup> musician 'Sweet Micky.' Martelly, representing the Farmers' Response Party, was a far-right candidate with a vocal base of support. Other front-runners in the 2010 Presidential elections included Jude Celestin, the successor handpicked by the outgoing president, René Préval, and Mirlande Manigat, University Professor and wife of former president Leslie Manigat, who only held office for a few months in 1988 as the result of a coup. The 2010 presidential election was notable not only for its purposeful recall and falsified tally of votes, but also for the CEP's specific measures that barred the most popular party, Fanmi Lavalas, from participating in the elections.

<sup>30</sup>Merriam Webster definition

<sup>31</sup>Merriam Webster definition

<sup>32</sup>The Hope Party

<sup>33</sup>Haitian musical genre, comparable to Merengue

To put into perspective the disparity of the 2010 elections in Haiti imagine if in the U.S. 2008 elections a strategically implemented technicality prevented any Democratic candidate from running. The Presidential election would then have become a race between John McCain and representatives from the Independent, Libertarian, Green Party, and others. This would be a blatant disenfranchisement of the 52.9 percent of the American voters who would have voted for Obama. This type of party and voter disenfranchisement is precisely what happened in Haiti in 2010. Without the popular party Fanmi Lavalas, voter disenfranchisement was huge resulting in only 23.05 percent voter turnout in the first round. As a result the elections became a free for all, a toss up with no clear front-runner. The first round of elections resulted in Mirlande Manigat coming in first with 31.37 percent, Celestin in second with 22.48 percent of voteshare, and Martelly in third with 21.84 percent. On the day of these elections however, it was clear that widespread fraud “including ballot stuffing, missing ballots, voter intimidation, and other abuses” had taken place, necessitating a second round and a recount to solve disputes (Rosnick, 2)

The OAS was requested, at behest of the Haitian government, to resolve the dispute through a separate analysis. The OAS commission was made of experts primarily from the United States, Canada and France, countries with a recognized history of interventionism in Haiti. It was this committee’s recommendation to disregard the released results and put Martelly in second place with Célestin in third. However, a private analysis conducted by the Center for Economic and Policy Research (CEPR) has revealed two serious flaws in the report that altered the results of the first round: the report did not use sound “statistical inference from the sample of 919 tally sheets” they examined, and it did not consider the “1053 tally sheets, or 9.5 percent of the total, that were

missing.” (Rosnick, 2) It can then be concluded that this decision was not in fact a statistically informed decision, but a political one. Outgoing President Préval who wanted to cancel and reschedule the presidential elections due to the fraud contested this decision.

More evidence that points to the political nature of the recall includes international pressure and private sector pressure to remove Celestin and accept the OAS’s recommendation. “US Ambassador Susan Rice even went so far as to threaten to cut aid, even though the country was still recovering” from the earthquake of 2010 (CEPR, ‘Clinton Emails Reveal “Behind the Doors Actions” of Private Sector and US Embassy in Haiti Elections’). Due to the FOIA’s release of Secretary Clinton’s emails from her private server, the U.S. State Department’s influence on the final election results have been revealed in partiality (some information has been redacted). This includes conversations considering the delicacy of the situation, how to quell the violence, and an email in which Laura (likely to be Laura Graham, an official of the Clinton Foundation) advised Clinton to “consider a message and outreach strategy to ensure that different elements of Haitian [sic] society (church leaders, business, etc.) buy into the mms [Michel Martelly solution] and are out their [sic] on radio messaging why it is good.” (CEPR, ‘Clinton Emails Reveal “Behind the Doors Actions” of Private Sector and US Embassy in Haiti Elections’)

Meanwhile, Martelly’s vocal and violent base of constituents were able to protest to show their support for their candidate and push the International community to favor the recommendation that put him in the second round. President Préval inevitably conceded to the pressures from the international community and the private sector and accepted the OAS recommendation. The recount declared Martelly the second place winner with 22.2 percent of the vote,

and Celestin with 21.9 percent. This allowed Martelly to proceed to the second round of elections in competition with Mirlande Manigat, of which he won 67.6 percent to 31.7 percent (CEPR, ‘Clinton Emails Reveal “Behind the Doors Actions” of Private Sector and US Embassy in Haiti Elections’).

After these events transpired, Reginald Boulos, a Haitian industry mogul representing private sector interests, wrote an email to Cheryl Mills, a member of the State Department, expressing his congratulations that the elections had played out favorably:

Cheryl,

We believe that our “behind the doors actions” have been so far more effective than the usual public statements of the past. The business community has played a major role in helping to get the November 28 elections back on track, by convincing President Préval to request the OAS mission, by publicly denouncing the results of the 1st round, and as late as yesterday morning (3 hours meeting with Préval) convincing him to drop the idea of annulment of the elections.

As you know, President Préval has not been happy about the position of the Private Sector. But to his credit, he has kept the dialogue open with us. For the first time in a long time, the position of the Haitian Private Sector is based on principles and not particular interests. As I mention to you many times, we need your support to continue to build a strong and ethical Private Sector. Everyone in the diplomatic circles and among the Haitian political leaders will confirm the role played by the Private Sector Economic Forum over the past 6 months. Our published polls (controversial for some) has contributed in modernizing the way elections are monitored as the results confirmed the quality of the polls and the OAS results were consistent with the quick counts we organized on November 28. On behalf of the Haitian Private Sector, I want to thank you for the commitment you have shown toward Haiti and the long hours and days you have spent promoting the reconstruction efforts. My best Regards,

Reggie

Dr. Reginald Boulos

(Freedom of Information Act Released Email)

Boulos himself has ties to the 1990-94 coup d’état and has operated a USAID funded clinic that has been accused of collaborating with paramilitary groups. The business community’s “major role” in the outcome of the elections is troubling to say the least, as a major tenant of transparent and legal elections is that the voteshare should only be determined by the citizens of Haiti, not by corporations with ulterior motives. The involvement of big business in elections however is not unique to Haiti, and similar criticisms could be framed against the U.S. elections and the role of SuperPACs.<sup>34</sup> However, in Haiti, where the foundation of democracy is fragile due to years of political instability, the internationally backed private sector’s sway becomes even more nefarious and harmful.

Another allegation of international interventionism from 2011 is that Martelly supporters received special payments and perks from USAID. Before Martelly’s inauguration it has been revealed through the FOIA that the Mouvement Tèt Kale<sup>35</sup> (MTK) was under a paid contract of one hundred thousand dollars with USAID, via the for-profit contractor Chemonics. According to USAID’s political party assistance policy, this is a clear transgression; support to political parties or “de-facto political parties” is only to be given if funding has no effect on the elections and all parties receive “equitable levels of assistance.” (Johnson) Later in the election cycle, the MTK was also the only group who received funding for “civic engagement” duties, which were described as being given hand tools to clear the streets to prepare for the inauguration. Chemonics denied the obvious political affiliation between the MTK and Martelly despite it being founded by leaders within the Martelly campaign. (Johnson)

The use of aid in the 2010-2011 elections proved to be more beneficial for contractors employed by USAID than for the election proceedings itself. And regardless of the intentions of the U.S. State Department, the point remains

<sup>34</sup>large corporatized groups that support and fund presidential candidates that will benefit their interests

<sup>35</sup>baldhead movement- a reference to Martelly and precursor to the Party Tèt Kale which was formalized in 2012

that aid measures intended to help promote transparency in elections resulted in further resources for specific political parties and factions within Haiti. In this case resources become political capital for whichever small elite group manages to grasp it. As shown through the State Department's and the OAS's push for Martelly, political groups affiliated with his campaign benefitted the most from foreign aid. Moreover, the legacy of the 2010-2011 elections and these instances of intervention and political favoritism is a Haitian administration that owes its allegiance to the U.S. State Department, rather than to the people of Haiti. This was made evident by Martelly's flight to the U.S. to meet with the State department immediately following his inauguration.

*Pattern Recognition;  
Undercurrents of aid and influence in Haitian elections*

From the two case studies I have chosen to address, I identified six major actors that influence and interplay in the Haitian Elections; the Haitian presidential candidates and their parties, the CEP, the Haitian voters, election observers and NGOs (global civil society), the U.S. legislative branch, and the U.S. executive branch. The 1990 elections were a case in which the Haitian voters supported their candidate of choice, as evinced by the huge voter turnout and the requisite reports from global civil societies that the election was free and fair. Additionally, in this case, despite global civil society's status of impartiality in promoting elections, ties and political affiliations led the international community to support Bazin over Aristide. The U.S. legislative body had a more nuanced role, with different groups like the Black Congressional Caucus, republican, or democratic leaders all advocating for different stances. Finally,

U.S. covert operations had a more nefarious role in the realm of elections, as they had been funding controversial leaders like Cédras, future head of the coup against Aristide, simultaneously and covertly.

In the 2010 elections, the power play between actors shifted. While the covert arm of the U.S. did not play an evident role in the elections (although unreported, it is likely that intelligence on Martelly's past involvement with the Macoutes and alleged participation in the drug trade has been thoroughly gathered<sup>36</sup>) the U.S. State Department played a significant role in influencing the outcome of the elections through their promotion of Martelly, aid allocation to specific party groups, and dealings with Haitian elites and contractors. The 2010 elections showed that the OAS (global civil society), while asserting their objectivity and impartiality in the election process, blatantly altered the election outcome in favor of Martelly's victory. Because of the obvious interference of civil society and the U.S., in addition to the role of the CEP in propagating party exclusion, the elections saw low turnout and a general detachment of the Haitian people from the election process.

As the 2015 elections unfolded, I resolved to closely watch the actors I have identified. The power plays at work in the 2015/2016 cycle have followed the trends laid in place during the 2010-2011 elections. The breach in the social contract in 2010/2011, that would otherwise hold the government responsible to its people, has resulted in a slew of concerns that shape the context of these current elections. The concerns include a lack of fair representation at all levels of the government due to Martelly's failure to address the expiration of legislative and municipal seats.<sup>37</sup> The lack of fair governmental representation has resulted in the population's distrust of the CEP's appointed members and the legislature they instated for election procedures. With a general sense of disillusionment

<sup>36</sup> Many of Martelly's friends and allies have been convicted of drug trafficking. His ties to the Haitian military and paramilitary groups, who were often involved in illegal drug trade in the 80s and 90s also prompt these allegations. Additionally, members of the senate requested the formation of an investigation committee tasked with determining President Martelly, Prime Minister Lamothe, and the President of Suriname's (Desire Bouterse) relationship. President Desire Bouterse was convicted in absentia in the Netherlands for drug trafficking. Bouterse also had a noted interest and relationship with Haiti as both President of Suriname and head of Caricom.

<sup>37</sup> see fig. 5 for visualization of Haiti's elections timetable and lapses

from the Haitian people and over 100 parties in competition with a free-for-all political mentality, its no wonder voters are discouraged and angry.

# 5

## The 2015 Election Cycle

- 66 *Indicators to Watch in the 2015 Elections*
- 66 *Planning the Elections*
- 74 *August 9th & October 25th Election Results*
- 80 *Violence, Cancellations & an Uncertain Future*
- 83 *Narratives & Framing Elections*

### *Indicators to watch in the 2015 Elections*

As the 2015 elections began to be planned in earnest, I monitored the classic and general indicators that suggest the level of transparency within Haitian election proceedings. These indicators include protest frequency, acts of violence and intimidation, party and leader interactions, voter turnout, and the narratives of Haitian and non-Haitian news publications and international actors. I have divided my analysis of the 2015/2016 election cycle temporally, addressing first the planning and organization of elections by the CEP from the winter of 2015 to summer of 2015, followed by the first round of parliamentary elections on August 9th, to the disputed second round of parliamentary elections and the first round of presidential elections on October 25th, and finally the botched final round of presidential elections originally scheduled for December 27th. Figure 5 shows a table of the Haitian elections for the past 10 years. The dates marked in red indicate where the terms for parliamentary seats expired. There are two squares per election cycle to represent the first and second round dates, the norm in Haiti's election proceedings which operates under a two-round electoral voting system.

### *Planning the Elections; Martelly, the CEP, and Voter Discontent*

The planning of the 2015 elections began in earnest after mass protests mobilized in Port-au-Prince on January 17th, 2015 calling for Martelly's resignation. The protests arose as the terms of 10 of 20 remaining senators and 99 of 99 seats in the House of Deputies expired on January 12th, leaving Martelly to rule by decree. Martelly attempted to quell the crowd by promising that within

48 hours a CEP would be appointed to oversee the planning and implementation of elections. (HaitiLibre, 'The announcement of the CEP is making waves')

Meanwhile, general unrest was rampant within Haiti, manifesting in a two day transport strike on February 2nd and 3rd, general demonstrations on the 5th and 7th, and a general strike on the 9th and 10th with complaints over failure to pay public sector teachers and educators and complaints against an illegal tax levied on international money transfers and phone calls. There were many arrests, several deaths and many wounded from police open fire. (HaitiLibre, 'Two Days of Demonstrations') By mid February, Pierre-Louis Opont, then President of the CEP, held a press conference releasing the first draft of the Electoral Decree and information about an electoral timetable. There were significant complaints from Haitian civil society about the soundness of the CEP's draft and the prospective timetable. On February 23, the RNNDH released a public letter to the members of the CEP expressing concerns and reports of fraudulence among the procedures for selecting members of the Communal Electoral Bureaus (Bureaux Electoral Communaux (BECs)) and the Departmental Electoral Bureaus (Bureaux Electoraux Départementaux (BED)) as determined through the electoral decree.<sup>38</sup>

In the letter, they describe the system through which a candidate is selected to join the BEC indicating proper identification documents, a written exam, an interview, proof of residence and more. However, certain reports of fraud were conveyed to the RNDDH, who also recounted that "certain jurors have not inspired confidence in the candidates, notably because of the personal and political questions asked of them while they expected to be interviewed on their aptitude to be part of the BEC."<sup>39</sup>

Additionally, the report noted that many prior presidents of the BEC,

<sup>38</sup>See Fig 6 for a visualization of the structure of the BED, BEC and CEP in election proceedings. Information for the chart is from the modified Electoral Decree published by the CEP.

<sup>39</sup>Translated from French; 'Toutefois, certains jurés n'ont pas inspiré confiance aux postulants, en raison, notamment des questions plus personnelles et politiques qui leur ont été posées alors qu'ils s'attendaient à être interviewés sur leur aptitude à faire partie d'un Bureau Electoral Communal (BEC).

# Haiti Elections 2006-Present

	President 5-year term	Senate staggered 6-year term	Chamber of Deputies 4-year term > 5-year term starting 2015
7 FEB 2006	Rene Preval is elected as president.	30 of 30 seats elected.	99 of 99 seats elected.
3 DEC 2007	[Preval is a member of the Lespwa party. He replaces former President Aristide who was ousted in 2004]	[Due to prior instability, 2/3 of Senate had already expired by 2004. As a result: 1/3 of Senate seats were elected for a 2-year term, 1/3 for a 4-year term & 1/3 for a 6-year term]	[Due to prior instability, all seats had previously expired]
2008			
19 APR 2009		12 of 30 seats elected.	
21 JUN 2009		[Elections to replace the 2-year Senators]	
12 JAN 2010	earthquake		
28 NOV 2011		11 of 30 seats elected.	99 of 99 seats elected.
20 MAR 2011	Michel Martelly is elected as president.	[Elections to replace the 4-year Senators]	[Elections to replace all deputy seats]
JAN 2012		10 of 30 seats expire.	
2013		[Elections to replace the 6-year Senators were never scheduled. 20 Senators remain]	
2014			
12 JAN 2015		10 of 30 seats expire.	99 of 99 seats expire.
9 AUG 2015	1st Round of Presidential Elections Held [contested results]	Elections Round 1 and 2 are Held	Elections Round 1 and 2 are Held
25 OCT 2016	2nd round of Presidential Elections TBA		

Fig 5




Fig 6



who would have some experience in elections, were not accepted. They noted additional anomalies in two Haitian departments, Nord and Artibonite, where the appointed members of the BEC had questionable links to certain party leaders. (RNDDH) The letter specified which departments had the most reported problems of fraud and urged the CEP to reformulate their electoral decree and take further care to prevent such fraud from occurring.

By March 2nd, a modified Electoral Decree was ratified and adopted. However, reports of fraud persisted throughout March culminating in several sudden replacements and unanticipated removals of various BED and BEC members. AlterPresse reported that “Certain members of the [BED] and [BEC] of six departments were replaced, and meanwhile the process was reprised entirely in the Sud-Est (department), informed a CEP communiqué (No. 9) sent on the 26th of March, signed by the President of the institution, Pierre-Louis Opont.” (AlterPresse) The mechanisms by which the CEP carried out the removals were entirely at their discretion, and undisclosed to the public. Meanwhile, the CEP slowly and shakily set up the institutions for conducting elections amidst large doubts of transparency. Despite the alleged corruption, parties and candidates began signing up in earnest, not wanting to miss out on an opportunity even if the quality of elections was less than stellar.

As a result of the free-for-all mentality, and inadequate and ambiguously worded requirements for prospective candidates in the Electoral Decree written by the CEP, more parties than ever were registered for the 2015 elections. Even though Martelly was unable to run for office again<sup>40</sup>, members of his political party Parti Haïtien Tèt Kale<sup>41</sup> (PHTK) were in the best position to benefit from elections. Furthermore, according to the Haiti Observer, of the 100+ parties running in the 2015 house of deputies and senatorial elections, Haitian senators

<sup>40</sup>due to the nonconsecutive term law for Haitian presidents

<sup>41</sup>Martelly's official party, 'The Haitian Bald Head Party'. Not to be confused with the MTK, 'Mouvement Tèt Kale', an offshoot.

and other politicians estimated that roughly 60 of those parties were affiliated or owned by Martelly. In May, the official number of registered parties was 131, with 99 actually participating in elections. This is compared to 57 parties in the 2006 elections and 67 in the 2010 elections (Haiti Elections Blog). This would suggest that the Martelly regime was doing everything in its power to consolidate control of the upcoming elections, and facing little censure due to its close ties with the foreign actors that are charged with overseeing and ensuring fair elections. Other parties were undoubtedly following the same tactics. Besides the problematic implications of 60+ parties under the same umbrella, having so many parties and candidates on a single ballot prompted serious logistical complications for ballot production among a largely illiterate population. Overall, Preval's party, Vérité<sup>42</sup>, had the most candidates in the elections with 115 total, followed by Martelly's PHTK with 110, then Fanmi Lavalas and Platfom Ptit Desalin<sup>43</sup> with 99 each. The final list of approved presidential candidates totaled 58.

The CEP's overall elections planning had a running budget of 68.5 million dollars. The electoral fund for the 2015 elections was made up of contributions from many different countries, with the greatest amount of financing provided by the Haitian government at about 13 million dollars. By late June of 2015, the U.S. and Brazil had donated an additional 6 million to the fund, bringing the total to 44 million dollars, still 22.5 million short of the operational goal. Despite the majority contribution from the Haitian government, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) managed the electoral fund. The UNDP outsourced production of kits and election materials like voting booths and indelible ink to a South African company, Lithothec, at a cost of about 4.5 million dollars. (HaitiLibre, 'Zapping Électoral') Additionally, the UNDP outsourced printing of ballots to a UNDP affiliated company in the

<sup>42</sup>Translation: 'Truth' Party

<sup>43</sup>Translation: 'Little Dessalines platform', reference to Jean-Jacques Dessalines, Haitian founding father

United Arab Emirates. The outsourcing was criticized by many Haitian leaders, particularly Jaccéus Joseph, an electoral advisor who said, “You cannot submit an underdeveloped country to international competitors for the manufacture of products that local firms can do.” (Le Nouvelliste, ‘Achat Des Matériels électoraux’) Similar tactics have taken place in previous elections as well as during reconstruction efforts after the earthquake.

In late June and July, the CEP was also occupied with the production of videos, radio segments, and other propaganda as part of a civic education campaign to increase women’s participation in the electoral process and to explain voter and candidate registration processes.

Mid to late July was marked by heightened tensions and violence as the impending elections drew nearer and the stakes grew higher with campaigns finally getting underway officially on July 8th. The government was responsible for providing funds to the participating parties in order for them to campaign. According to Le National, the CEP distributed the 500 million gourdes<sup>44</sup> to political parties using the following formula; 30 percent to the 120 political parties, 20 percent to presidential candidates, 20 percent to municipal and local candidates, 10 percent to senatorial candidates, 10 percent to deputy candidates, and an additional 10 percent to parties with female candidates, highly educated candidates and handicapped candidates. Newton Saint-Juste, candidate for Fron revolisyonè pou entegrasyon mas yo<sup>45</sup> (FREM), told Le National that “...this formula gives more money to political parties close to power,” not to mention the fact that the funds were disbursed with only a few weeks before elections. Other candidates complained that none of their parties were consulted to help determine the disbursement formula and that parties like Tèt Kale already had access to government funds to campaign on their own dime. (Le National, ‘Les

<sup>44</sup>Haitian currency

<sup>45</sup>Translation : revolutionary front for the integration of the masses

Partis Rejettent La Formule Adoptée’) Here the lack of transparency in the equal disbursement of aid to political parties very closely follows the pessimist stance of Lust-Okar and the assumptions of Dahl’s axioms 4 & 5 laid out in the Theoretical Chapter.

One candidate was shot and killed on July 22nd. On the same day, 3 were injured in a partisan struggle between two groups of people supporting different candidates. (Radio Metropole Haiti, ‘3 Blessés à Petit Goâve Lors Des Violences électorales’) Additionally, another candidate’s supporter was ‘lynched with machetes’. On the following day, the bodies of Shiller Anthony, Jackson Pierre, and Roody Raphael were found. They had been posterizing for their candidates in the night when they were attacked and shot by unidentified men on motorcycles. (Alterpresse, ‘L’insécurité Ne Faiblit Pas’) (Haiti Press Network, ‘Haïti Insécurité’)

More instances of contention occurred as Vérité’s constituents continued to protest against presidential candidate Jacky Lumarque’s unexplained disqualification. Pierre Esperence, head of the country’s largest human rights group explained to the Miami Herald,

...weeks after attacks against René Préval, Vérité and members of the CEP, the CEP took the decision to put [Jacky Lumarque] out of the race. It gives you the impression that it’s a political decision rather than something based on legal grounds... The CEP has not done any civic education campaign to mobilize voters on the necessity of these elections and participation will be weak... The people who will benefit are the drug traffickers, delinquents, kidnappers and people who are implicated in crimes who are part of the electoral process. We have a lot of fear that the next parliament will be a parliament of bandits.

(Miami Herald, ‘Haiti Launches Campaign Season for Elections’)

I mention these particular instances of violence, protest and

disillusionment to illustrate the general atmosphere of Haitian civil society leading up to Election Day. I did not mention every incident that happened because they were numerous and generally went unaddressed or unresolved by police or by MINUSTAH. A report released by RNDDH covers a period from July 9 and August 2 of 2015 and cites 9 armed confrontations, 5 assassinations, 2 attempted assassinations, 7 wounded from gunshots, 2 wounded from machetes, 17 wounded from stone-throwing, and 10 cases of beatings (RNDDH, 'Campagne électorale sur fond de violences: le RNDDH tire la sonnette d'alarme', 1) All of these acts of violence were related to political affiliation and the upcoming elections. Despite these overwhelming concerns, much of the international community continued to push for elections to be held, as the only way to move out of the political deadlock and insecurity that characterized Haiti's socio-political climate. These efforts were perhaps doomed from the start.

### *August 9th and October 25th Election Results*

With about 1,500 observers deployed through a joint force of RNDDH, CNO and COHANE observed the Election Day proceedings on August 9th. Their report noted that polling stations were often cramped and ill lit and that instead of queuing people bunched together. Additionally, the RNDDH reports that the voting materials were problematic; the polling booths did not ensure adequate privacy, the indelible ink did not show up immediately, allowing some to vote more than once, and the transparent pvc bags were not able to hold enough ballot papers. Finally, complaints were lodged against supervisors and staff who did not arrive on time or at the assigned location, and incidents of rigging. Finally, "in at least 50% of the voting centers, acts of intimidation, of

violence and of electoral fraud were registered." (RNDDH, 4) The acts of ballot stuffing or intimidation were often carried out by political party representatives. Haiti's National Police (Police National d'Haiti (PNH)) did little to prevent the violence.

The issue of voter turnout was particularly notable. Figure 7 shows the voting age population turnout in Haiti from 1990-2015. Voter turnout is traditionally lower in parliamentary elections than in presidential elections, but even so, the last 3 elections have seen exceptionally low turnout from the voting age population. In 1990 Aristide won with 67.5 percent of the electorate. The 1995 elections were still facing the consequences of that coup and because Aristide was unable to run, Rene Préval of Fanmi Lavalas won the election. 2000 once again saw a revival in turnout as Aristide was elected President again. After Aristide was ousted in another coup in 2004 and cast into exile, Haiti began to see a significant decline in turnout. It is also important to note that few developed countries even see voter turnout in the 80-100 percent range. When you consider infrastructural barriers, Haiti's 68.3 percent voter turnout in the 2000 presidential election is quite impressive by all standards.

In 2006 and 2011, Fanmi Lavalas was excluded from participating in the elections despite mass protests. Rene Préval ran instead under something of an offshoot of Fanmi Lavalas, the Lespwa party, which resulted in a turnout of 48 percent. However, from 2006 onward, citizen discontent manifested in turnout consistently below 25 percent of the voting age population in parliamentary races, and down to about 19 percent in the subsequent 2011 presidential election.

During the first round of elections in August 2015 a growing concern was not only low voter turnout, but low-turnout that corresponded to specific

regions. For example, it was noted in a CEPR's report, 'Full Breakdown of Preliminary Legislative Election Results in Haiti', that the West department, "Haiti's largest department, with 41 percent of registered voters" had very low turnout (just under 10 percent). This department happens to be "one of the areas most impacted by electoral violence and the closure of voting centers." Additionally, "a public opinion survey released early this year noted that the West department was where president Martelly had the lowest approval ratings – more than 15% lower than in any other department." When the incumbent uses violence as a tool to prevent citizens from voting, this can have a great impact on the election results.




Fig 7

The official results from the August 9th elections were released on August 20th. The CEP had determined the votes would count if 70 percent of the tally sheets were counted in each district, although the reasoning behind this

number was never provided. Twenty-five towns did not meet this threshold and would have to re-run elections. In the Senate race, only Artibonite fell below the 70 percent threshold. Overall PHTK had the most candidates advancing to the next round of elections on October 25th. Many groups questioned the results due to the arbitrary and inconsistent decisions of the CEP, the violence and fraud on Election Day, and the chaotic and haphazard logistics. (CEPR, 'Full Breakdown of Preliminary Legislative Election Results in Haiti')

In the interim period between the release of the first round results and the second round of elections, most media sources espoused ambivalent language about the election results with titles from the Miami Herald like "Observers: Haiti elections weren't perfect, but they happened – finally" or Yahoo News' "Disorder, delays mar Haiti's long-awaited election." In the articles, violence and public outrage were downplayed considerably. Elena Valenciano, head of the EU's electoral observation mission, was recorded telling journalists that election proceedings had "near total normalcy." An OAS preliminary report congratulates the fact that elections were held, but does not go into any depth about the anomalies and violence that happened on and prior to Election Day.

The Haitian Elections Blog, a blog run by staff on the IJDH and affiliated human rights groups summarize the reaction of Haitian civil society, a deep contrast to the disinterested language of some members of the international community:

In the aftermath of the elections, tensions were high in many parts of the country. On August 10, supporters of disgruntled candidates in Saint-Marc, Boucan Carré and Mariani protested, blocked roads and burned tires to demand the cancellation of the elections. In Mirebalais, several candidates led protests denouncing election irregularities. Two days later, the police arrested three candidates in the area accused of breaking into and vandalizing the local Prosecutor's office and holding its employees hostage. In Marigot,

in the South-East, 11 of 13 deputy candidates called for new elections and accused Parti Haïtien « tèt kale » (PHTK) and Pati Pou Nou Tout (PONT) candidates in the area of committing violent acts on election day. Supporters of the 11 candidates attempted to burn down the communal voting bureau, according to Haiti Press Network. The mood in Jérémie on August 10 was bitter and frustrated, Le Nouvelliste reported, the day after an election marked by significant irregularities and violence in the Grand'Anse region. In Plaisance, supporters of certain candidates broke into the communal electoral bureau and burned the ballots, in an effort to force the cancellation of the elections in the area. In Port-au-Prince, 14 candidates led a protest to demand a cancellation of the election.

(Haiti Elections Blog, 'Haiti Elections News Roundup – August 18')

The blog continues to summarize that most of the protestors blamed President Martelly's PHTK, others decried the elections as an “electoral coup d'État”, and many called for total cancellation of the first round of elections.

By September, Vérité announced it was withdrawing from the elections. By October, CEP member Nehemy Joseph resigned, stating in his letter, “Today, I am increasingly convinced that completing my mandate would involve me in illegality. (I feel that my credibility will end up melting away like an ice block if I do not leave.) Indeed, the various unsuccessful efforts I made to persuade some of my colleagues to reconsider certain decisions made in error are, among others, factors that have deepened my concerns.” Meanwhile, civil society groups began meeting in earnest to plan and ameliorate elections for round two. Prime Minister of Haiti, Evans Paul met with the Congressional Black Caucus, members of the OAS, and U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry. The OAS and members of the State Department and international community were mostly unanimous in urging support to continue with the elections timetable already set in place by the CEP, promising greater support from MINUSTAH. In October of 2015, Kerry met with President Martelly to negotiate the continued process of Haitian elections

and in the U.S. 61 members of congress in the House Foreign Affairs Committee wrote to Kerry insisting that he urge the Haitian government to provide for the security of voters and candidates in the next election and also undertake more thorough analysis of the election results and reports. On October 14th, the UN Security Council also approved a year-long extension to MINUSTAH's stay in Haiti to ensure safety in the next round of elections.

The pressures from the U.S., the Haitian government and the international community were useful to the ends of alleviating the violence in the October 25th elections. This round, in which citizens voted for the legislative runoff elections, a round of municipal elections and the first round of presidential elections, had far fewer incidents of violence and an increased number of arrests made by the PNH (over 70 reported). Voter turnout also increased slightly to about 26.4 percent, which is an improvement from August 9th, but still very low for a presidential election. Besides reports of some shootings, burnings, and general violence, most reports mentioned incidents of voter fraud particularly from mandataires, or monitors from political parties who had special passes and free range to vote at any polling center. However, CEPR's Haiti Relief and Reconstruction Watch Blog notes that many of the mandataire passes were sold to the highest bidder in the days leading up to the election.

Once again the international coverage of the elections glossed over many of the issues that characterized the elections with pieces titled; “Haiti hails presidential vote without violence” from Yahoo News, “Polls in landmark Haiti elections close after no big snags” at Reuters, and “No violence as Haiti holds elections” at BBC. These innocuous titles suggest perhaps that the absence of violence equates to fair and free elections. Not only were the actual incidents of violence and fraud on Election Day ignored, Western media chose to frame

the day within an uplifting and celebratory narrative. However, as results were announced on November 5th, many Haitian groups took to the street in outrage at the results. The results put Jovenel Moïse, Martelly's presidential candidate for PHTK in the lead at 32.8 percent, followed by Jude Celestin of (Ligue Alternative pour le Progrès et L'Emancipation Haitienne (LAPEH))<sup>46</sup> with 25.3 percent, Moïse Jean-Charles of Ptit Dessalines with 14.3 percent, and Maryse Narcisse of Fanmi Lavalas with 7.1 percent. However, even though Moïse is in the lead, his lead represents only 8.7 percent of registered voters. The Haiti Elections blog notes that Pro-Martelly parties "already have a combined 45 of 93 seats locked in, and another 21 candidates going to the second round" in the Chamber of Deputies. They also stipulate that Preval affiliated parties including Vérité, Initié<sup>47</sup>, and LAPEH hold a total of 23 seats in the Chamber of Deputies and 10 more candidates for the second round. Tèt Kale affiliated parties are also estimated to hold 12 of 20 Senate seats. The ascension of PHTK affiliated parties in the Legislative body would ensure the continued mandate of the Martelly regime.

*Violence, Cancellations, and an Uncertain Future;  
Jocelerme Privert's provisional government*

In November of 2016, Brazilian-based independent research group, Igarape Institute conducted a poll that surveyed voter confidence and sought to cross reference election results. From the time of the exit poll to the date when the preliminary results were announced, they found that voters fell from 82 percent to 10 percent agreement with the statement "As far as I can see, this election is fair, there is no fraud." Additionally, of those surveyed, 37.5 percent voted for Jude Célestin, 30.6 percent for Moïse Jean-Charles, 19.4 percent for

<sup>46</sup>Translation : Alternative League for Progress and Haitian Emancipation

<sup>47</sup>Translation : Unity

Marysse Narcisse, and only 6.3 percent for PHTK's Jovenel Moïse. (Fox) Haitian civil society groups teamed up with RNNDH, COHANE and CNO in another report denouncing the election results of October 25th as a "Vast operation of planned electoral fraud." Many more human rights groups, civil society organizations, and the opposition coalition of presidential candidates known as the G8 called for independent audits and investigations of the election results. As civilian protests mounted in December, Haitian parties began to start pushing for a transitional government. As more independent civil society groups came to the fore rejecting the results and calling for investigations, meanwhile the U.S. State Department and the OAS pushed for the third and final round of elections based on the current results.

At this point, the similarities between the events of the 2010/11 elections and the 2015 elections had become glaring. Despite great levels of funding to ensure fair and transparent elections, the results of the first round of presidential elections appeared to be compromised by fraud. And instead of using their power to undertake a recall, the UN, the State Department, and the OAS call for Haiti to adhere to the electoral schedule at all costs, desiring a speedy resolution rather than a fair one. In 2010/11, the tension between Haitian civil society and human rights groups and the powerful agents of the international community was won by the latter, resulting in the instatement of Martelly through dubious determinations. However, on January 22nd of 2016, the CEP made a last-minute decision to cancel the last round of elections (which had been pushed back from December 27th to January 24th) after the G8 announced on the 17th that they would not participate in the elections. On February 7th, Martelly left office as he had promised months before, and agreed to an accord through which a transitional government would take over.

As I followed the elections this past year, I had hoped to follow a clear narrative from start to finish; I was skeptical, yet hopeful, that a result that reflected the will of the people might be attained. Although the state of Haiti's transitional government and electoral proceedings leaves many questions unanswered, in some ways this was a victory for Haitian civil society. The Haitian masses that turned out to protest the January elections, and the G8 coalition that refused to participate proved that there is leverage to be held against powerful actors like the State Department and the OAS, who have intervened in Haitian sovereignty before. Although the current provisional government President, Jocelerme Privert<sup>48</sup>, and his government is no guarantee of future transparency, it is a better foundation for fair results than what was provided for under the Martelly regime.

Without making any allowances for violence perpetrated by Haitian party members or the dubious quality of laws crafted by the CEP, the environment in which the elections were planned and carried out was influenced by the historical legacy of the State department and OAS's intervention. These foreign actors laid the path for Martelly's monopolization of control, and laid the seeds of distrust in the electoral system within the Haitian people. Although the election results are unconvincing, they do support many global studies that show that foreign aid and elections in developing countries tends to produce a net advantage to the incumbent regime, among which includes Ryan Jablonski's cross-national study of elections in developing countries *How Foreign Aid Affects Election Outcomes*. In this case, although presidential elections were remitted, the first two rounds showed prominent victories for parties related to the incumbent PHTK regime.

<sup>48</sup>Formerly the president of the Senate

## *Narratives & Framing Elections*

While global media expresses diverging takes on the role of foreign aid and policy in Haiti, most major western news outlets use platitudes to describe electoral outcomes. They habitually reinforce the necessary role of international support in order for elections to transpire in Haiti; without which it is often suggested that Haiti will descend into chaos. Many major news outlets including CNN, the BBC, the Miami Herald<sup>49</sup>, and the Washington Post tend to label violence and governmental corruption as the greatest threats to upholding elections. Conveniently absent is a frank discussion of the causes for which the current administration is flush with power and unchallenged; a discussion which would necessitate a critical eye towards the interventionism of the international community in the last two elections. Claims of interventionism, often overlooked as conspiratorial, can be confirmed due to the FOIA's release of relevant materials, and should have a place in the media's rhetoric. Some news sources that objectively evaluate the U.S.'s role in molding Haitian elections include Al-Jazeera, CEPR, and other investigatory-based publications have performed more in depth and investigatory research on the topic.

Haitian media is in contrast extremely critical of corruption and cynical towards the U.S.'s espousal of promoting transparent elections. Haitian news sites including LeNouvelliste, Alterpresse, and Haitilibre are passionate about confronting this topic. Many sites even boldly point fingers when it comes to critiquing both fraud within their own government and collusions within the greater international community. Haitian readers often will fill the comments sections of the more popular news sites with diatribe against interventionism and the U.S. As I conducted my research, I began to notice certain readers posting

<sup>49</sup>The Miami Herald covers Haitian affairs extensively due to the large Haitian ex-pat community

comments religiously on different news outlets, often leaving a link to purchase their book on how to fix Haiti at the end of their post. Clearly Haitian civil society is robust, even in forums like web articles where most Haitians have limited access there is active and vibrant engagement and a desire for fairness and equality. Additionally, because of high rates of illiteracy, much of Haitian politicking occurs via radio. Unfortunately, I did not have much time to delve into this area.

In conclusion, the way the Haitian elections are framed in the media exists in a feedback loop with international consensus and international policy. When only a few sites credit interventionism and foreign aid with strings attached as a major obstacle to fair elections in Haiti, the problem cannot be remediated. This is a challenging issue as media whitewashing allows institutions like USAID and other development institutions to continue intervening in Haiti without reprimand. So, not only is foreign aid itself often detrimental to legal and transparent election proceedings, but the news outlets' narrative only serves to further exacerbate this interference.



# 6

## The Decline of the Developmental State

88 *Remodeling Haitian Elections*

91 *Paradigm Shift in Development Policy*

94 *Arguments Against Aid Dependency, NGOs*

97 *Conversations with Brian Concannon*

*Remodeling Haitian Elections;  
Synthesizing Theoretical Models with Real-World Constraints*

While learning about the theoretical effects of aid on electoral transparency match up with the results of the 2015 elections, there are certain real world constraints that prevent the theoretical ideal of democracy from matching up with the realities of Haiti's government. In any case, re-examining the ill-fated 2015 Haitian elections through the lens of Dahl's theoretical model proves to be an interesting exercise, and offers different postulations on how to restructure the interactions of foreign aid and Haitian sovereignty. With the goal of building democracy and promoting fair elections:

- 1) If aid is fueling incumbents and corrupt politicians in Haitian elections, then international donors should stop giving aid and let elections happen without any intervention or assistance.
- 2) If aid is fueling incumbents and corrupt politicians in Haitian elections, then international donors should directly control the implementation of aid at every step of election proceedings.
- 3) If aid is fueling incumbents and corrupt politicians in Haitian elections, then the development of a national institution and oversight committee drawn from Haitian civil society should supervise and funnel all aid through a national development program.

Although option 1 would be the best way to establish democracy in the long run, Haiti already has a history of reliance on foreign aid. As it exists in the globalized world, with its particular economic disadvantages set into motion

through historical measures of exclusion and control, Haiti needs aid to function. Unfortunately, the reliance on aid has limited Haiti's ability to develop strong democratic institutions naturally over time, as it might have in an alternative timeline. Today's Haiti does not have adequate funds to run elections without foreign aid.

Based on the historical shortcomings of foreign intervention, option 2 is not the ideal road for building democracy in Haiti, although it is one that is frequently espoused by many actors in global civil society and the United States. As the failure of the elections began to sink in, on March 12, 2016, Miami Herald Op-ed contributor Roger F. Noriega put the onus of said failure on corrupt Haitian politicians. He advised "unless the international community takes a stronger hand, Haiti will never break out of the cycle of dependency that has made it a burden for its neighbors." Noriega, who held senior positions in the Bush administration, undoubtedly shares the views of many who propose that further domination can somehow lead to an end to dependency, a facile and patronizing (and racist) solution to development. This suggestion also remains ignorant of the fact that many corrupt leaders within Haiti have been supported or bankrolled by the international community. Domination at the hands of the international community and the U.S. has not worked in the past, and there is no reason to believe it would work in the future. This option also makes Haitian elections more vulnerable to blatant manipulation of election results. The more control the international community has, the more likely the elections will skew against the will of the Haitian people.

In my view, option 3 is the only viable option to truly promoting free and fair elections in Haiti, because it breaks out of the binary of either pushing for stronger international control or removing aid completely. However, breaking

out of this binary also leads to certain difficulties and increased cooperation and transparency from all actors. Many NGOs are doing great work in their efforts to support and bolster Haitian civil society, and this should continue. However, the development of a national institution that is free from the ties of the international community and is also able to buffer itself against the blows of corruption from within is the most important investment Haiti and the international community can make. This is a somewhat nebulous proposition, mostly because I do not presume to fully understand the intricate and specific needs of the Haitian people and government. In many ways, the CEP was meant to fulfill this mediating and unbiased role in elections, and perhaps the solution in the future is to develop a more robust and transparent CEP in time. However, the international community failed to use their considerable power to ensure the establishment of a truly fair and legitimate CEP, of and for the people.

Option 3 ties in closely with one of the Schumpeterian criterion for democracy mentioned in my theoretical analysis; that being the development of a robust professional bureaucracy to ensure fair elections and contestation. This is something that Haiti needs to address immediately or else it can be expected that favoritism, nepotism and inequality will be symptoms of more elections to come. To that end the establishment of a permanent council is vital.<sup>50</sup>

The stymied development of strong internal institutions is an issue prevalent within the developing world. And the decline of the developmental state is one of the main reasons for which aid has become ineffective or counter-effective. The actors partaking in Haitian elections are the U.S., the international community like the UN, IMF and WB, the Haitian people, and the Haitian political parties made up of competing bourgeois factions. The most important

<sup>50</sup>The Conseil Electoral Provisoire was always meant to be a permanent institution. Instead, the CEP has changed from election season to election season primarily because of presidential failures to adequately and correctly determine members for a permanent council. As is shown in the diagram, the CEP is made of 9 members, with 3 members from each branch of government. President Martelly's appointments to the permanent council in 2012 were fraudulent because he illegally appointed 3 Supreme Court Justices (skewing the judicial branch's appointments). Additionally, because elections were delayed in the Senate, the legislative branch was not able to appoint 3 of their members to the permanent council. The Council was thus malformed and not able to hold elections.

element missing from this list is the Haitian state. Most successful nations have developed a strong sense of nationhood and a level of sovereignty that allows them to advocate their interests at the international level, and simultaneously protect the interests of their people from unfavorable international economic policies or political agreements. For most groups, as I mentioned earlier, this state formation occurs through political evolution, shared cultural values, and painstakingly achieved landmarks on the path to democratization. However, under the paradigm of development in the global world, policies are quick to push to achieve superficial or cookie-cutter markers of democratization, like timely elections, without holistically addressing the core, unique needs of the Haitian state. While the blame should not solely be relegated to the international community since class warfare and inequality has also been a huge barrier, Haiti's failure to develop strong national sovereignty and statehood is symptomatic of a larger trend in globalization and development policies in the Global South.

### *Paradigm Shift in Development Policy; from the Developmental State to Neo-Tocquevillian Civil Society*

As I mentioned in my brief chapter about the origins and structure of aid organizations, the rise of aid institutions originated with the culmination of World War II. In the post war state, Keynesian economics was the dominant theory informing development policy and national rehabilitation efforts. Through analyzing the Great Depression, John Maynard Keynes promoted growth of aggregate demand through government expenditures and investment, stabilization measures, and lowered taxes as the answer to development. These policies influenced the first wave of development theory and practice after World

War II from European countries, to the ‘Asian Tigers’, which includes China, Singapore, South Korea, and Taiwan. Most of these countries had tremendous growth as a result of borrowing from the WB and the IMF, state led development initiatives, and investment in state-owned companies and enterprises. These countries became emblematic of the developmental state and the Keynesian approach to economic development.

The 1970s and 80s marked a dramatic shift in development policy from the demand-side Keynesian approach towards a supply-side formula of neoliberalism and privatization. Arguments can be made that the shift towards neoliberalism was incited by general market loss in the global west and economic insecurities derived from the rise of Asia. Whether or not this was the conclusive cause of the shift, the rhetorical justification for such a change was formed in theoretical economic claims that free markets and privatization are better ways to promote growth and development in struggling nations. While this is not necessarily untrue, the outcome of these policies was that foreign investors from the US and the Global West were able to ensure their involvement in third world development, and thereby safeguard their market share in developing markets and infant industries. Some examples of these measures include the notorious Structural Adjustment Programmes<sup>51</sup> (SAPs) of the 80s and 90s, imposed upon developing countries in the Latin America, Africa, and parts of Asia as the condition for loans from the WB and the IMF. Generalized, the conditions of the SAPs included a required opening of markets to foreign investment, “removing ‘excess’ government controls, increasing free trade, and lower tariffs on imports.” (WHO, ‘Structural Adjustment Programmes’)

As the international community and aid organizations shifted away from the archetype of the developmental state towards privatization and supply-

<sup>51</sup>The Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs) comprise loan packages given by the IMF and the WB starting in the 1980s to developing nations with the intention of allowing their economies to become more open and deregulated and to promote monetary stabilization. Other conditionalities include the minimization of trade barriers. Few of these loan packages led to notable growth among developing countries, and instead led to increased debt, private wealth accumulation, and the disenfranchisement of national sovereignty.

side economic policies, there was also a simultaneous advancement of the Neo-Tocquevillian conception of Civil Society. As the role of the state fell, the significance of civil society, the non-profit sector and NGOs rose appreciably starting in the 1980s. The international insistence on neoliberal measures and the rise of NGOs is generally encapsulated within the greater narrative of globalization and the transcending power of global action. While many NGOs do great work, and while globalization as a whole is neither ‘good’ nor ‘evil’, developing nations have faced specific consequences due to this hegemonic shift. These trends can be seen to differing degrees in all corners of the world, some beneficial and some not; however, its effects on Haiti have been particularly dire.

Clive Y. Thomas, Director of the Institute of Development Studies at the University of Guyana, summarizes the decline of the Caribbean developmental state as having “collapsed under the twin pressures of U.S. self-defined geo-strategic national interest in the area and globalization.” (Thomas, 68) Thomas believes the opportunities to create a nationalistic countermovement to the prevailing forces of neoliberal globalization are “only exploitable to the extent that there exists within the country a strong national consensus built around, and at the same time helping to elaborate a common acceptable ideology and sense of citizenship; a high level of political mobilization among wide groups, strata and classes in society; and a leadership secure in the public’s confidence and with the political will required to pursue them.” (82) Examining case studies like China, India, and Japan further bolster this claim that the key to their developmental success has been in their ability to summon strong protective measures to secure national interests and safeguard against the potentially erosive forces of globalization. The key truly is internal consensus (whether it is enforced through authoritative means or brought about through democratic measures). Without it,

most developing countries succumb to the whims of foreign interest and global sway.

One of the most effective ways of securing internal consensus is through political mobilization with a sweeping national mandate in an election cycle. For this reason, understanding the relationship between aid, foreign intervention and fair elections becomes increasingly important in Haiti.

### *Arguments against Aid Dependency, NGOs*

Before looking more closely at different methods of summoning national protective measures among developing nations, I want to briefly address contemporary critiques of neoliberal development policies as well as Global Civil Society (or NGOs and international institutions). For example, the channels through which foreign aid is disbursed have become exceedingly problematic, especially in Haiti. CEPR estimates that as of July 2014, roughly just 1 percent of aid was actually allocated to Haitian organizations and companies. In this way, the aid that could be used to foster the growth of Haitian Civil Society is finding its home in U.S. groups and global civil society instead. (CEPR, ‘US Congress Passes Aid Accountability Legislation...’) More and more, the international aid institutions and Bilateral ODA are facing reports of the failure of aid measures and the consequences of aid dependency in developing countries.

Dambisa Moyo, Zambian-born international economist, is known for her thoughtful criticism of the role of aid in development economics, stating that aid dependency is one of the primary reasons for stagnating economies in African countries. In her Wall Street Journal article *Why Foreign Aid is Hurting Africa*, she mentions some of the adverse effects of aid including aid-induced inflation

and “Dutch Disease”, when large inflows of aid money raise the country’s home prices, which renders exporting next to impossible. Additionally, when aid money causes the recipient country’s inflation to rise, the country will tend to address excess liquidity by issuing bonds, which result in more fees incurred for the government. In the following passage, Moyo describes the detrimental effects of aid dependency:

We know that economies that rely on open-ended commitments of aid almost universally fail, and those that do not depend on aid succeed. The latter is true for economically successful countries such as China and India, and even closer to home, in South Africa and Botswana. Their strategy of development finance emphasizes the important role of entrepreneurship and markets over a staid aid-system of development that preaches handouts.

(Moyo, ‘Why Foreign Aid is Hurting Africa’)

Instead of rejecting aid altogether, she suggests using aid to support local entrepreneurship and existing markets in the recipient country. She advocates the same strategy for food aid implementation; instead of supplying food from donor countries, the donors should buy food from local farmers and provide distribution services to those in need. Although Moyo focuses on critiquing aid practices in African countries, heavy aid inflows into Haiti have the same destructive effects she describes. The example of food aid distribution would have been a sound strategy in Haiti both before and after the earthquake.<sup>52</sup>

Moyo also mentions the importance of a country’s ability to use and distribute aid effectively, called absorptive capacity. When the recipient country has weak institutions and a low absorptive capacity threshold the country is often unable to use the massive inflows of aid. In *Does Foreign Aid Really Work*, Roger C Riddell explains that studies show that “as the volume of aid increases,

<sup>52</sup>US law in the 90s and 2000s ensured that food aid imports into Haiti were monopolized by US farmer coalitions and sent at subsidized prices. Haitian farmers can’t compete with the low prices. The result of decades of food aid dependence has led to changes in the Haitian diet, which used to be greatly diversified with different tubers, grains, and vegetables to heavy consumption of rice and chicken, which are subsidized through USAID.

its marginal utility declines, confirming that beyond a certain level, aid is subject to ever-falling or diminishing returns.” (227) To this end, Riddell also suggests instead of fueling huge amounts of aid contributions toward inept governments or using third party contractors to fulfill development programs, cash transfers directly to the poor may prove more effective. However, there is a pervading reluctance among the international aid community to place cash in the hands of the poor for fear of misuse of funds. This paternalistic handholding is one of the reasons why so many aid efforts barely manage to trickle down to the people who most desperately need the assistance. (Erhenfeld)

Besides its problematic reliance on ODA, Haiti is also considered the NGO capital of the world, with more than 10,000 NGOs estimated to be in operation. There is a lack of comprehensive studies showing the normative effects of NGOs in Haiti, and elsewhere in the developing world. There are many studies however, showing a correlation between a particular NGO or development initiative and decreases in poverty, lowered cases treatable illnesses, and gains in education. My interest however, is not in the gains of any one NGO, but the long-lasting effect of chronic reliance on NGOs to provide services for social and economic betterment, health, and education. Although such a study would be difficult to accomplish, I remain skeptical that a nation of NGOs would prove capable of instilling long lasting development and economic success.

There are of course notable exceptions to this evaluation of global civil society. Partners in Health remains to many the prevailing archetype of what a good NGO looks like. What sets Partners in Health (PIH)<sup>53</sup>, or Zanmi Lasante, apart from other NGOs is that it operates under the rule of law of the Haitian government and does not do anything in Haiti without approval and cooperation from the government. The staff is primarily composed of Haitian workers.

<sup>53</sup>Partners in Health, or Zanmi Lasante, is a global health organization started in Haiti and founded by Dr. Paul Farmer, Ophelia Dahl, Dr. Jim Yong Kim, Todd McCormack, and Tom White.

Additionally, its actions are focused around healthcare, which in its nature tends to fall more soundly under the ‘pure’ definition of aid. Moreover, PIH also makes a commitment to providing institutional change through decentralized initiatives, like the new medical center they have set up in Mirebalais.

Also, as I have previously mentioned, the IJDH/BAI is another NGO that does great work in Haiti in areas of human rights and prosecution. All the lawyers at BAI are Haitian, and they attempt to not only hold human rights violators accountable through legal mechanisms, but they also have begun making serious strides to hold the actions of large aid institutions like the UN accountable<sup>54</sup>. More about the IJDH and BAI will be discussed later.

So what is important about the role of global civil society in Haiti is not the quantity, but the quality of NGOs. Haiti has become a free for all of NGOs and unfortunately the government is not robust enough to screen for the quality of NGOs that plant their roots in Haitian society. While some NGOs manage to fill in gaps where local services are insufficient, many do not promote long lasting institutional growth. Instead, many NGOs are able to capitalize on the plight of the poor and disenfranchised and only offer piecemeal or unnecessary operations.

### *Conversations with Brian Concannon<sup>55</sup>*

As I mentioned in the first chapter, after my initial interest in Haitian elections was piqued, I went to intern at the IJDH, where I learned so much

<sup>54</sup>Besides providing legal assistance to political prisoners and disseminating information on human rights violations in Haiti, another IJDH objective is to ensure aid accountability through filing lawsuits. This is something not many institutions do, and most legal work has to happen through “internal mechanisms” or “congregational advocacy.” For example, one of the major struggles the IJDH is undertaking is a litigation measure against MINUSTAH for improperly screening a battalion of Nepalese UN peacekeepers who were experiencing a surge in cholera infections before they were brought to Haiti for post-quake efforts. Their arrival and subsequent improper waste disposal led to the first cholera epidemic in Haiti in hundreds of years. Furthermore, MINUSTAH and the U.N. failed to take accountability of the outbreak and address it. From the IJDH website, “The New York Times has called the cholera litigation “the most organized challenge to UN immunity yet”... The case has universal implications beyond Haiti because it challenges the UN to comply with its legal obligations of establishing settlement mechanisms and upholding its commitment to be a global leader in accountability and promotion of human rights for all.”

<sup>55</sup>See Appendix D for full interview

about the nuances of the contemporary struggles in Haiti. Brian Concannon, Founder and Director of the IJDH, former co-manager of the Bureau des Avocats Internationaux and a well-respected human rights lawyer, shared some of his vision of the steps needed to ensure long lasting stability in Haiti through the context of internal development and external forces. He first started working in Haiti in 1995 when he joined a UN human rights mission. He described his first job as a Human Rights Officer leading the Raboteau Massacre Trials<sup>56</sup> as a failure:

...among the things that were revealed by the failure of the case was the inadequacy of this idea of jumpstarting the justice system. It was like trying to jumpstart a car that had a dead battery, but also no brakes and three missing tires. You know you had to do a lot more than just a jumpstart. And, it was through thinking about the lessons of that, of the failure of those trials- the [Guy Malaré Assassination trials<sup>57</sup>]- that we decided that ... just having international lawyers wasn't going to work. We needed Haitian lawyers.

After that Concannon hired Mario Joseph, a highly recommended Haitian lawyer, who has been managing and co-managing Attorney of the BAI since 1996. Concannon reinforces the importance of free and fair elections in Haiti by expressing his hopes for a repeat of the 2000 election in which “you had a government where the same party (Lavalas) swept all the offices everywhere. They had all the mayors, everybody in parliament and the president (Aristide). So a huge kind of popular mandate... but then what happened was the international community did whatever they could to undermine the government.” Most notable among the efforts to undermine the Haitian government was the Development Assistance Embargo.

For Concannon, a democratically elected government is not always

<sup>56</sup>The Raboteau Massacre Trial was a trial that fought against impunity of paramilitary groups in Haiti who perpetrated the massacre. Raboteau is a neighborhood that became known for resisting the Duvalier regime in the 80s. When the army performed the coup that removed Aristide from power in 1991, the people of Raboteau demonstrated against the act and held nonviolent resistance during the military dictatorship that followed. Finally, in 1994, the military shot at, attacked, and terrorized the occupants of Raboteau in an orchestrated massacre.

<sup>57</sup>Guy Malaré, the former Justice Minister of Haiti, who advocated for human rights and democracy, was assassinated on October 14th, 1993 by members of FRAPH (a paramilitary group who received covert support from the US) and the Haitian army. These assassinations as well as the Raboteau Massacre led to a greater trial : International Criminal Law: V. Justice for Haiti: The Raboteau Trial [the Raboteau Massacre Trial] which fought against impunity in Haiti. It resulted in the conviction of many former military and paramilitary heads and soldiers.

essential for economic and social progress in developing nations, but he “doesn’t see any other way in Haiti.” Concannon notes that most of the progress that he’s seen in Haiti has come about during the periods in which there have been democratic governments. He expounds that having a democratically elected popular government would allow Haiti to present a united front against the influences of foreign pressure and competing aid initiatives that sometimes run counter to Haiti’s best interests. He references Rwanda as an example of a government that, in the aftermath of genocide, successfully promoted its own state-led development agenda and forced the international aid community to support them on their own terms:

What I see as the model is kind of what Rwanda and Ethiopia have done. Where they’ve said [to the aid organizations] you know this is what we’re doing. Here’s the plan. Everybody needs to register. Everybody needs to go along with the plan or you leave. And in Rwanda [the aid organizations & NGOs] said ‘oh you’re, you know, biting the hand that feeds you. You can’t tell us what to do. We know what we’re doing and you’re this corrupt government’ ... And they all threatened to leave! And then Rwanda said ‘bye bye’ and all of a sudden they couldn’t justify to their donors why they weren’t working in Rwanda. So they all came back and said ok we’ll do it. ... But if you go from 1994 right after the genocide to Haiti right after the coup, if you look at the economic development, I think Haiti’s line is sort of a slight increase and Rwanda’s is straight up. It just shot straight up. And they’ve just done great things because they forced aid to be effective in ways that in Haiti, it would be very difficult to do partly because of the [lack of] democracy....

Concannon is quick to stipulate that Rwanda is a different case from Haiti, in that much of its efficacy was due to its autocratic leader who managed to ensure, regrettably through force, that everyone was in consensus with his development plans. The main assertion is that a strong unified government and state-led development plan operating on a plane above the authority of aid

organizations is what allowed Rwanda to develop at the rate that it did following the Rwandan genocide. Rwanda's GDP grew from -50.2 percent in 1994, the year of the genocide, to 35.2 percent the year after, and managed to sustain growth annual rates ranging from 8 to 13 percent over the next five years. (World Bank). In *Origins of Political Order*, Fukuyama notes that theorist Samuel Huntington proposed a similar method of transition to what is illustrated in the Rwanda case; the "development strategy that came to be known as the "authoritarian transition." This was the path followed by Turkey, South Korea, Taiwan, and Indonesia, which modernized economically under authoritarian rulers and only later opened up their political systems to democratic contestation." (Fukuyama, 459) Although this may not work in Haiti, due to its history of authoritarian leadership failing to instigate economic development, its clear that political order and unification is key to developmental progress.



# 7

## Conclusions

104 *Reflections*

106 *Looking Ahead*

## *Reflections*

Electoral politics and the role of foreign aid in Haiti is quite a specific topic. As I conducted research, I realized I was surging deeper and deeper into a unique set of historical facts and figures and attempting to use it to understand the greater logic of global development. At times I feared that to fully embrace the specifics of the Haitian elections case, I would lose a more universal aspect that I was trying to achieve in my thesis, or perhaps appear too niche or irrelevant to those not already interested in the topic. I was assuaged of these fears once I began to draw conclusions in my final chapter about the developmental state. Perhaps the leaps made in that chapter are too far and removed from the data collected on elections, but overall I think that Haiti, with its complex history and political evolution, is a perfect microcosm for understanding development policy and democratization in today's globalized world. Though Haiti has a unique history as the first and only nation built from a successful slave rebellion, it has since faced enormous challenges in its transition toward democracy. While elections are only one small part of what constitutes a democracy, it represents a key aspect of this transition. Fair and equal representation is a right worth fighting for, and it is a struggle that is felt worldwide, beyond the borders of Haiti.

My thesis questions were Does foreign aid impede democratization and development in Haiti? And, is the push towards democratization as a tool in development policy problematic? I began with a literature review summarizing the history of Haitian state formation and the scope of political and economic development from the 17th century to today. This foundation was vital to helping me understand the history of competitive clientelism, presidential monarchy, and elite pluralism. It also helped form a thread of continuity that gave the current

elections greater gravity. As I mentioned in the literature review, I wanted to understand Haiti's historical and political backdrop as fully as possible in order to avoid what Fukuyama terms "historical amnesia." With a historical foundation in place, I first proposed a theoretical stance from which to derive answers to my research questions. I analyzed the theoretical role of elections as a feature of the state and a process of democratization using Dahl's axioms and Schumpeter's democratic criteria. I adopted the pessimist framework of Lust-Okar in which she argues that foreign aid does in fact impede democratization through the lens of elections by providing more resources to the incumbent, leading to corruption and the increased suppression of the competition.

In order to support this theoretical stance, I accumulated evidence in the form of accounts of foreign aid expenditures, covert action, and election results and indicators from past elections and the ongoing 2015/16 elections. Many of my sources included human rights watch group reports, economic reports, articles, and official elections documents. My findings supported my theoretical postulations, but also presented a more nuanced and complicated view of the role of aid and intervention in elections. For example, I did confirm that there were many instances of funds from USAID being more likely to fall into the hands of groups affiliated to the incumbent regime. This happened in the 2010/11 elections where the MTK party was given funds over all other groups to conduct civic duties relating to elections. There were many other indicators supporting my argument that foreign aid has impeded true democratization including, the outsourcing of the production of elections materials to USAID or UN affiliated companies, the CIA covert funding to paramilitary troops who then orchestrated the 1990 coup, preferential treatment of US supported Haitian candidates, the falsified election results of 2011 that put Martelly in power,

and the low voter turnout that signals the Haitian peoples distrust of elections. Through the scope of elections, I also came to the conclusion that the US, the UN's, and the OAS' one-track policy of promoting elections at the cost of transparency and objectivity is problematic and counter-effective.

After my analysis of both past elections and the current election cycle, I tackled my second research question from a macro view. I looked at the state of development policy today and noted that as neoliberal economics and neo-Tocquevillian civil society play a larger role, the developmental state's importance has been lessened to the detriment of these developing countries. I argue that NGOs and foreign aid is not enough to ensure long lasting and strong institutions. While some NGOs and ODA is positive and necessary, they should not be relied upon as the means through which to create strong and long-lasting development.

### *Looking Ahead*

The transition from authoritarianism to a democratic government hinges on the long and difficult process of institution building. Political development and the creation of democratic statehood is a constant and never-ending process that each country endures in its own highly unique way. While I think a robust democracy is probably an attainable goal in Haiti's path, focus on democracy building by emphasizing timely elections may not be the key to political order in Haiti. An insistence on trying to fit Haiti into a one-size-fits-all international model of democracy is not only a hindrance to true order and development, but also a mechanism by which Western countries continue to exert authority and continue a legacy of imperialism. What I've taken away

from this research is that it can often be difficult to distinguish between truly altruistic foreign assistance and imperialism. For these reasons, Western and international promotion of elections in Haiti is not a beneficial or useful project. I propose instead that donors should focus on helping Haitian civil society building strong, transparent internal legal institutions like a permanent CEP. Haiti has the capability to take lead itself to development, order and success if there is political unity from within. As long as foreign and international actors intervene in elections like they have in the past, it seems unlikely that this unity can be achieved and sustained. Of course, Haiti still has internal concerns that need to be addressed, including checks to be placed on the impunity of the bourgeoisie and political elites, however, I believe external intervention represents a more pressing threat to democratization.

The culmination of these recent elections has given me hope that Haiti can present a strong united front against the erosive forces of globalization and imperialism. The power of mobilized protests, resignation of key leaders who refused to participate in corruption, and the calls to action from Haitian civil society succeeded in cancelling the final presidential election round. As I finish this thesis, there are reports that Interim President Jocelerme Privert has pushed ahead with the creation of an Electoral Verification Commission to investigate allegations of electoral fraud in the first two rounds before proceeding with rescheduling the cancelled final round. This goes against the wishes of many international groups and the US State Department, who would prefer to push ahead with timely elections, despite numerous citations of fraud in the first rounds. The will to sniff out corruption is a step in the right direction, and proof that Haitian civil society can find ways to resist the sway of the foreign actors that help fund elections. I remain hopeful that Haiti, and other nations facing similar

struggles, can build national consensus and strong institutions in order to begin more positive and vigorous transitions toward development and democratization.

*APPENDIX A*  
*Organizations and Abbreviations Index*

BAI – Bureau des Avocats Internationaux, Bureau of International Lawyers  
BEC – Bureau Electoral Communal, Communal Electoral Bureau  
BED – Bureau Electoral Departmental, Departmental Electoral Bureau  
CEP – Conseil Electoral Provisoire, Provisional Electoral Council  
CEPR – Center for Economic and Policy Research  
CNG – Conseil National de Gouvernement, National Council of Government  
CNO – Conseil National d’Observation Electorale, National Council of Electoral  
Observation  
COHANE – Conseil Haïtien des Acteurs Non Etatiques, Haitian Council of Non-  
State Actors  
IFES – International Foundation for Electoral Systems  
IJDH – Institute for Justice and Democracy in Haiti  
IMF – International Monetary Fund  
MINUSTAH – Mission des Nations Unies pour la Stabilisation en Haïti, United  
Nations Stabilization Mission In Haiti  
NDI – National Democratic Institute  
NGOs – Non-Governmental Organizations  
OAS – Organization of American States  
OECD – Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and Development  
PNH – Police National d’Haiti, Haiti’s National Police  
RNDDH – Réseau National de Defense des Droits Humains, The National  
Human Rights Defense Network  
SAP – Structural Adjustment Programmes

USAID – United States Agency for International Development

UN – United Nations

WB – World Bank

WHO – World Health Organization

*Haitian Political Parties*

FL – Fanmi Lavalas, Waterfall family

FNCD – Front National Pour le Changement et la Democratie

Inité – Unity

Lespwa – hope

MTK – Mouvement Tèt Kale, Bald-head movement

PHTK – Parti Haïtien Tèt Kale, Haitian Bald-head party

RP – Repons Peyizan, Farmer’s Response

Vérité – Truth

## *APPENDIX B*

### *Interview with Brian Concannon*

A. Anisa Holmes, Interviewer

B. Brian Concannon, Director of the Institute for Justice and Democracy in Haiti.

[BETSEY] Betsey Chace, Development Director for IJDH, present during the interview.

-----  
A. Can you explain your background a little bit? What in your academics or career led to your interest in Haiti?

B. Academically, I have a BA, I majored in history and then I went to law school. When I left law school I worked for a corporate firm in Boston that was... I never felt that was going to be my whole career but after a few years there I felt that I wanted to be doing something that I felt was meaningful on a daily basis. I didn't mind working on firm- the firm's a lot of interesting work but it just wasn't...it was a lot of work and I just thought I was spending one big part of my life doing it and that I didn't find as much meaning as I felt I needed so I decided to get into human rights work. And the first job I got actually was in Haiti and I never thought I'd be in Haiti very long. I got a job with United Nations. I thought I'd be there for you know a year maybe two and then go somewhere else and somewhere else never happened. It's been sort of one opportunity after another to do something good and then just sort of finding meaning on a daily basis that's kept me involved in Haiti and I've been doing it since 1995.

A. And so your first job with the UN, was it just an open placement? Or did they place you in Haiti for a specific reason?

B. Yeah I was I was recruited through the U.N. volunteers program to work on a mission- it was a human rights mission in Haiti. So I was specifically hired for Haiti. At the time, Haiti was in the news at that time, because it was just transitioning from a dictatorship. But I didn't have a particular interest in Haiti. I had studied French in college so I think that helped me you know get the job. This combination of having legal experience and the French.

A. Can you speak a little bit about your experience working on the Raboteau Massacre Trial and meeting Mario (head legal atty. at the Bureau des Avocats Internationaux)?

B. Sure, I met Mario actually because I hired him. The original, the office that we both worked at was the BAI or (Bureau des Avocats Internationaux). And the original conception of the BAI was that it was international lawyers and investigators coming down to try to, what they said was, jumpstart the justice system. There was a case that went to trial not long after I got there- about two or three weeks after I got there- that turned out to be kind of a

failure and among the things that were revealed by the failure of the case was the inadequacy of this idea of jumpstarting the justice system. It was like trying to jump start a car that had a dead battery, but also no brakes and three missing tires. You know you had to do a lot more than just a jump start. And, and it was through thinking about the lessons of that, of the failure of those trials- the [Guy Malarly Assassination trials]- that we decided that we needed to have... that just having international lawyers wasn't going to work. We needed Haitian lawyers. So we asked all the people we worked with for recommendations and everybody said Mario. And we had the interview process and I think I hired him on for about three months. And I agreed to work for the BAI for the month of June 1996. We hired Mario probably in July or August for three months and you know he's still there twenty years later.

A. Okay so, I guess can we transition to what were your goals in founding the IJDH?

B. So IJDH was founded in a completely bad way to start an organization. Typically you sort of think through and say 'OK what are our goals and where are we going to get the money' and you have some rational strategic planning. We didn't have that at all. Because what had happened was there was a coup d'état in 2004. All the people, the BAI was already working very hard before the coup. The coup made it much worse, the BAI was working much harder because it had a lot of its partners and allies and judges were getting killed, thrown in jail, tortured and so we had an enormous amount of work but we also lost all our funding because the BAI was 100 percent funded by the government before 2004. And the new government was not likely to fund us. So we already had this existing work, a huge amount of work. It was a lot of work before the coup, and the coup had it skyrocketing. And so it was basically trying to come up with some mechanism to continue the work we were doing but also the flip side is that one thing that the 2004 coup revealed was that as long as we weren't able to pressure for US policies that respected human rights in Haiti, nothing was sustainable. Because basically the U.S. kidnapped Haiti's president and it was the main engineer behind the coup. And obviously there were Haitians involved in it but the Haitians would not have been successful. Or not have successfully overthrown the government without a lot of international help. And we also were deeply discouraged to find that the institutions that should have been that should have opposed the coup didn't. That includes human rights organizations, the media, and solidarity groups in the US. And they've been effectively marginalized. So they weren't speaking out in favor of democracy before he was overthrown or against this dictatorship that was you know killing people by the hundreds. And so what we felt we needed for IJDH was to establish a group that could both support to continue to work in Haiti representing political prisoners, doing human rights reports but also develop a new capacity in the US to influence public opinion and government policy in the US.

A. I guess with all those things in mind, do you find that it's difficult to leverage power to enact change in a positive way within this sort of imperialistic structure, this whole

framework? Is it hard to remain sensitive to your original goals while still trying to, you know, leverage power?

B. I think any social justice work worth doing is hard for that exact reason. Whether it's for the reason that you're going against very entrenched powerful interests that applies to the context, the imperialist context of Haiti but it also applies to the racist policy of Ferguson, Missouri, or you know housing in Boston, or sort of any kind of deep-rooted social justice issue. The response to that is going to be complicated and hard. I think that you just need to gauge your response to the reality of the situation. And so you don't say 'this is hard I can't do it' you know I would like to put a year into this and so much amount of resources and then when that doesn't happen you say 'oh this problem is too hard my year and this much money didn't solve it'. That's one approach, but not one that's going to lead to change. The other approach is that we're going to figure it out. We're going to keep working and figure out a way of doing it and especially we're going to do it in a very networked way. We're going to be humble about our own individual organizational capacity and say 'we can't do this change but who do we need to make this change happen and how can we help them get engaged in that fight.' This is you know this is almost any large scale social change follows a pretty similar template. If you look at you know school's desegregation. So in 1896 there was this case Plessey versus Ferguson where you know where the Supreme Court said separate but equal was fine and then in 1954 the Supreme Court said separate but equal isn't fine and it wasn't that the law changed- the constitution which hadn't changed in that period - what had happened was that the people in 1890 brought it to court precisely to challenge it, and they probably did a good job as lawyers, but they lost and then over the next half century you had lawyers continue to chip away at it but you also had academics putting out research papers undermining the intellectual foundations of apartheid. You had political people organizing taking to the streets changing the electoral calculus of the Supreme Court and of the people appointed to the Supreme Court. So you had a whole range of activities that ended up making this extremely important and extremely fundamental social change. Obviously you know it hasn't solved the problem of inequality in education but it makes very big step forward and to continue to solve that problem you need to do that continued network approach. So I guess we're always finding out that everything we're doing is hard is that we thought you know. But the response to that is we just got to keep trying to keep expanding the force that you are able to exert on the problem.

A. What is the significance of transparent and popular elections, specifically in Haiti? And I know you were speaking about this yesterday...

B. To me it's the foundation of progress in Haiti. And I think you know, I'm not sure that I would say that as a general rule you couldn't have social and economic progress without elections. If you look at an example like Rwanda I think there's very sharp limitations to sort of the electoral democracy of Rwanda. But you've had absolutely amazing increases



in, you know, in economic development and the realization of social rights. So you know it's- I can't say that elections are essential. But, I don't see another way in Haiti. We've seen every form of dictatorship and that never seems to work, so I think that the best bet in Haiti is that you do have a popularly elected government and-I think this is also important- a population that is willing and able to put pressure on the government to make sure that it serves the voters. Which is obviously always going to challenge the United States, it's a challenge in any democracy in which you have a special interest can often distort the system. But in Haiti it's much more distorted. You're not really going to have progress unless you have fair elections. But I think that that is demonstrated by the results and where you've seen progress in Haiti, economic and social, it's been under the democratic country, the democratic governments.

A. OK last question where do you see him in the next ten years in terms of stability and what are IJDH's goals for the next two years?

B. Where I'd like to see Haiti, would be much increased stability, so in terms of sort of the overall politics I'd like to see regular legislative elections, which have never been. So you know ten years from now there will be one more election- the presidential election this year another one five years and another one kind of eleven years down the road. So it should be, I'd like to see a continued regular presidential elections and kind of an increase in stability. The justice system I think there's been, over the last twenty years there's been a pretty remarkable increase in the capacity of judges and prosecutors which has been, you know, it's been nice to see. There needs to be more but there's been a decent, a decent increase in the sense that that increase can kind of go along about the same and things will be in pretty good shape. What I think there needs to be is much more serious inroads against corruption and against elitism. There needs to be a lot more mechanisms for poor people to access the justice system in ways that you know very few people are interested in supporting. So I think that's kind of the big thing; that you need to fight corruption and you need to find ways for poor people to access the system in full. And in terms of IJDH, so where are we going to be in ten years?

A. I mean, ideally where would you see yourself?

B. I would expect that... You know I think it would be nice that we doubled or tripled in size in terms of staff at IJDH and the BAI, you know the same thing perhaps you know perhaps doubles. One of the things that we'd like to see the BAI become is kind of an incubator. Right now BAI is the only real public interest legal organization in Haiti. And you know the BAI does in Haiti what thousands of organizations do in the US- separate organizations that do human rights defenders. Some do elections, some do women's issues, domestic violence, labor and BAI is kind of the only one doing all those things and what I'd like to see, and I think ten years is a good framework for this to start happening, is that BAI kind

of becomes an incubator for lots of other organizations so that you have the, you know the Haiti labor defense organization is spawned three or four years from now from someone who goes through the training program and then we can help get that organization funding till it gets on its feet and develops its own ability to get funding. And so I'd like to see the sort of you know whole range of public interest organizations that are, you know, that are inspired by and spawned by the BAI but that are independent. And have their own independent funding and you know are able to look at things from different perspectives. The other thing I think would be interesting from IJDH's perspective, I think we have a very interesting model of this you know- that no one else is doing of working so closely with an organization on the ground in Haiti and combining legal and non-legal legal work-. I'd like to see that model expanded and I'm not sure you know I don't know whether it would be that we sort of expand to other countries to become sort of the Institute for Justice and Democracy in Haiti, in Honduras and Nicaragua and you know name some other countries. That, you know, could be interesting, although there's great limits to that because you know, we don't have capacity, we don't know what's going on in Honduras... But it could be through some sort of merger bring people on and it could be that model to other countries or its just maybe helping other people set up you know the Institute for Justice and Democracy in Honduras that's doing that completely separate from us but we're helping them how to figure out how to adapt our model to their needs.

A. Yeah definitely. Yeah I think that's part of why I was interested in coming here because this model seems so much more authentic and effective than most other kind of aid organizations that just sort of, you know, drop into Haiti without any actual local, you know, support or base and that seems a little silly because as soon as they pull out there's nothing left remaining. So yeah I think...

B. You know that's something we do a little bit. I'd actually like to see us do more. There are a million things I'd like to see us do more of. Haha, maybe quintuple the staff.

[BETSEY interjects]. You're as bad as Mario!

B. (laughs...) I know. I can't say to Betsey 'Just get me the money! We're doing it!!' It's just cause Betsey's like, 'no I already did that for Mario, I'm not going to take that from two people.' So, that kind of keeps my limits down, but one thing I'd like to be able to do would be aid accountability, which we've done a little bit of but I think it would be really neat to find ways to push. I mean obviously the you know the UN case is a big international organization accountability issue, but I would actually like to be able to file suits of people who you know, were told this organization's going to do X.Y.Z. and then they pulled out. And not necessarily file suit but find ways to call them on it as a way of saying to this next organization 'you've got to do this right or there's going to be consequences'. And you know other organizations say you can't do that because that's going to keep people from doing it, coming to Haiti, and we'd say fine, keeps people from doing bad stuff in Haiti,

that's great.

[BETSEY] And educate donors. Educate you know taxpayers and donors about- you know this is what your money did and didn't do. And is this really where... I mean, and obviously, hopefully, that will channel all the money here instead, and even if that stops the money from going, that's better than doing what the money does.

A. Yeah I was going to ask if you guys think that aid is even a particularly useful strategy in terms of long lasting stability in Haiti, I guess particular, you know historically?

B. I mean clearly there's deep problems with aid and you know I think there's a, in terms of the debate is it better to sort of fix the problems understanding you're not going to fix all of them or is it better to just like stop it. You know it would be traumatic because in the sense that you've kind of created this dependency, say if the US said, if all the donors said 'we're just stopping aid now' you know people would die and that would be a hard decision to make. But what I think is the best solution... you could certainly make an argument that if Haiti had never had aid then it might be better off. Although you know, stopping aid would necessarily stop the world from doing other things to hurt Haiti. What I see as the model is kind of what Rwanda and Ethiopia have done. Where they've said you know this is what we're doing. Here's the plan. Everybody needs to register. Everybody needs to go along with the plan or you leave. And in Rwanda everybody said 'oh you're, you know biting the hand that feeds you. You can't tell us what to do. We know what we're doing and you're this corrupt government'...

A. The aid organizations said that?

B. Yeah. And they all threatened to leave! And then Rwanda said 'bye bye' and all of a sudden they couldn't justify to their donors why they weren't working in Rwanda and so they all came back and said OK we'll do it. And Rwanda's like... But if you sort of go from 1994 right after the genocide to Haiti right after the coup, if you look at kind of economic development I think Haiti's line is sort of like you know a slight increase and Rwanda's is straight up. It just shot straight up. And they've just done great things because they forced aid to be effective in ways that you know in Haiti, it would be very difficult to do that partly because of the democracy. You know I think it's easier for the international community to you know kind of buy off different people. One thing that works in Rwanda is that you basically had a single person who said you know my way or the highway and killed people who didn't listen to him. And you know there's obviously problems with that but it kept, you know his whole government you know stood by him when the international community, you know I'm sure they all, when he said 'My way or the highway', they all called up their friends at the ministries and said 'OK how help us undermine this?' And they all said, no we're not going to help you undermine it. And you know so you ended up having a system that works. It would be very hard for Haiti to pull that off. But Ethiopia was super weak and they did it

so...

A. So perhaps in a few years if elections and all go well, and the government starts consolidating their power...

B. Yeah, so I mean where Haiti could do better on aid, where sort of the hope is, is that you get an elected government and we can do support outside Haiti. So one of the things that happened- it's actually a very good example- in 2000 you had a government that the same party (Lavalas) swept all the offices everywhere. They had all the mayors, everybody in parliament and the president. So a huge kind of popular mandate but then what happened was the international community did whatever they could to undermine the government, among them, a development assistance embargo. So they said 'we're not going to do anything, we're not going to give any money to the government, we're going to do whatever the hell we want, we're going to give money mostly to government opponents to do government services.' And that deeply undermined the government. There wasn't much of a response from outside Haiti. Partly as the aid organizations all got bought off, so they said 'great, you're not giving money to the government so that's more money for us, so we can you know have better plants in our headquarters in Virginia'. And others just kind of bought the ideology, the anti-government ideology, but then you know we- I'll say us here at the BAI- we didn't do it because that was sort of outside of what we were doing. We did a little bit of working to complain about that and help some other groups like PIH and the RK human rights center more directly attack that. And we helped journalists, and you know we did a decent amount, but not nearly what was needed. So what could change things in Haiti is lets say you have fair elections this year and you get another government that's going to try to push the international community a little bit better, would be that we do a much better job of doing that. That we get like this aid advocacy group that we're working with. We do have much better ability to influence public debate than we did ten years ago and we would have to use that power three or four fold to be able to defend the Haitian government's ability to implement it's policies. You know which might, give kind of an interesting question of whether we can do that. So you know, let's say you did get that elected government, we probably wouldn't have political prisoners we have to do, so that's less work. We wouldn't have to complain about the government not having elections and so you know that might free up some time for us to work on other things which would be you know, it would be interesting to start a big aid accountability project. Which no one's ever done... Well? People are doing it. Most aid accountability is congregational advocacy or getting the word out. There are some people that are working through doing lawsuits or doing legal work through internal mechanisms. Like people are using the I.M.F.'s and the World Bank's internal mechanisms. But no one is really doing what we're doing of, you know, like in the UN case, is filing lawsuits. And that would be kind of an interesting innovation and that might you know might have some pretty good results. So that's just

you know something we'd have to think about doing. That's another reason why elections are so important. I mean in our work it could open up lots of opportunities on the aid accountability, on the cholera case. So you know one example shows why elections are so important: You currently have a president who was basically put there by Secretary of State Clinton and that's who he's accountable to. He's accountable to the UN and to the US, not to his own people. So when you get, I mean a Cholera Case just isn't it... it shows how crazily warped the whole thing is. I mean just imagine seven thousand people get killed in Massachusetts by the U.N. and Charlie Baker's saying oh 'we don't think you know the UN should be responsible for this'. You know of course he wouldn't say that. And that's because he doesn't have to worry about getting overthrown by the UN. And the fact that a president would refuse to take their side, when so many of his voters have been hurt by this or killed by this, just shows how warped it is. But if we get fair elections, what we talked about yesterday, you get the government to take the side, that's going to free up, you know, seventy five countries in the United Nations to the general assembly to start asking some really hard questions and you know really unleash a lot of other things which would be pretty exciting.

## *WORKS CITED*

- “Achat Des Matériels électoraux : Le CEP Mis à L'écart.” *Le Nouvelliste*. N.p., 24 June 2015. Web. 11 Apr. 2016. <<http://lenouvelliste.com/lenouvelliste/article/146488/Achat-des-materiels-electoraux-le-CEP-mis-a-lecart>>.
- Caroit, Jean-Michel. “Haïti : « Dépenser 100 millions de dollars pour des élections qui ne conduisent pas à la stabilité, c'est du gaspillage »” *Le Nouvelliste*. N.p., 26 Jan. 2016. Web.<<http://lenouvelliste.com/lenouvelliste/article/154891/Haiti-Depenser-100-millions-de-dollars-pour-des-elections-qui-ne-conduisent-pas-a-la-stabilite-cest-du-gaspillage>>.
- Carey, Henry F. “Electoral Observation and Democratization in Haiti.” *Haiti Policy*, n.d. Web. 13 Mar. 2016. Originally published in *Electoral Observation and Democratic Transitions in Latin America*
- Charles, Jacqueline. “Haiti Launches Campaign Season for Elections.” *Miami Herald*. N.p., 9 July 2015. Web. 11 Apr. 2016.<<http://www.miamiherald.com/news/nation-world/world/americas/haiti/article26921350.html#storylink=cpy>>.
- “Clinton Emails Reveal “Behind the Doors Actions” of Private Sector and US Embassy in Haiti Elections.” *Clinton Emails Reveal “Behind the Doors Actions” of Private Sector and US Embassy in Haiti Elections*. CEPR, n.d. Web. 17 Dec. 2015.
- Connor, Tracy, Hannah Rappleye, and Erika Angulo. “What Does Haiti Have to Show for \$13 Billion in Earthquake Aid? - NBC News.” *NBC News*. NBC News, 12 Jan. 2015. Web. 15 Mar. 2016. <<http://www.nbcnews.com/news/investigations/what-does-haiti-have-show-13-billion-earthquake-aid-n281661>>.
- Dahl, Robert Alan. *Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition*. New Haven (Conn.): Yale UP, 1971. Print.

Daudier, Valéry. "Des actes de violence à moins de 48 heures des elections." *Le Nouvelliste*. N.p., 22 Jan. 2016. Web. <<http://lenouvelliste.com/lenouvelliste/article/154771/Des-actes-de-violence-a-moins-de-48-heures-des-elections>>.

Décret Electoral, Chapitre Ier 'De L'Institution Électorale et de ses Instances' and Chapitre XI 'Du Scrutin'. Retrieved from Haiti Libre; <http://www.haitilibre.com/docs/decretelectoral2015.pdf>

"Democracy, Human Rights, and Governance Fact Sheet: Support for Haitian Elections, 2012 - 2017 (2015)." *Democracy, Human Rights, and Governance Fact Sheet: Support for Haitian Elections, 2012*. USAID, n.d. Web. 17 Dec. 2015.

Dupuy, Alex. *Haiti in the World Economy: Class, Race, and Underdevelopment since 1700*. Boulder, CO: Westview, 1989. Print.

Edmonds, Kevin. "NGOs and the Business of Poverty." *NACLA. North American Congress on Latin America*, n.d. Web. <<https://nacla.org/news/ngos-and-business-poverty-haiti>>.

Edouard, Lionel. "Les Partis Rejetent La Formule Adoptée - Lenational." *Le National*. N.p., 23 July 2015. Web. 11 Apr. 2016. <<http://lenational.ht/les-partis-rejetent-la-formule-adoptee/>>.

Ehrenfeld, Daniel. "Foreign Aid Effectiveness, Political Rights and Bilateral Distribution." *The Journal of Humanitarian Assistance*. Tufts University, 1 Feb. 2004. Web. 10 Apr. 2016. <<https://sites.tufts.edu/jha/archives/75>>.

Escribà-Folch, Abel, and Joseph Wright. *Foreign Pressure and the Politics of Autocratic Survival*. N.p.: n.p., n.d. Print.

"Fast Fact on U.S. Government's Work in Haiti: Interim Haiti Recovery Commission." U.S. Department of State. U.S. Department of State, 08 Jan. 2011. Web. 15 Mar. 2016. <<http://www.state.gov/p/wha/rls/fs/2011/154141.htm>>.

Fatton, Robert. *Haiti: Trapped in the Outer Periphery*. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2014.

Fatton, Robert. *Haiti's Predatory Republic: The Unending Transition to Democracy*. Boulder, Co.: Lynne Rienner, 2002. Print.

Fox, Ben. "Many in Haiti Suspect Fraud in Recent Election, Poll Finds." *Miami Herald*, 19 Nov. 2015. Web. 10 Apr. 2016. <<http://www.miamiherald.com/news/nation-world/world/article45448653.html>>.

"Foreign Aid Effectiveness, Political Rights and Bilateral Distribution." *The Journal of Humanitarian Assistance*. Tufts, n.d. Web. 05 Mar. 2016.

"Full Breakdown of Preliminary Legislative Election Results in Haiti." *Full Breakdown of Preliminary Legislative Election Results in Haiti*. Center for Economic and Policy Research, n.d. Web. 17 Dec. 2015.

Geffrard, Robinson. "Les Élections du 24 janvier reportées." *Le Nouvelliste*. N.p., 22 Jan. 2016. Web. <<http://lenouvelliste.com/lenouvelliste/article/154791/Les-elections-du-24-janvier-reportees>>.

Geffrard, Robinson. "L'insécurité et l'insalubrité, les deux autres guerres de Privert." *Le Nouvelliste*. N.p., 4 Mar. 2016. Web. <<http://lenouvelliste.com/lenouvelliste/article/156258/Linsecurite-et-linsalubrite-les-deux-autres-guerres-de-Privert>>.

Geffrard, Robinson. "Privert et Jean à la recherche de gens compétents pour le gouvernement de consensus." *Le Nouvelliste*. N.p., 4 Mar. 2016. Web. <<http://lenouvelliste.com/lenouvelliste/article/156257/Privert-et-Jean-a-la-recherche-de-gens-competents-pour-le-gouvernement-de-consensus>>.

"Haïti - Actualité : Zapping électoral... - HaitiLibre.com : Toutes Les Nouvelles D'Haiti 7/7." *HaitiLibre*. N.p., 27 June 2015. Web. 11 Apr. 2016. <<http://www.haitilibre.com/article-14343-haiti-actualite-zapping-electoral.html>>.

“Haiti: Aristide’s Famous Pe Lebrun Speech.” Haiti: Aristide’s Famous Pe Lebrun Speech. The Democratic Forum on Haiti, n.d. Web. 15 Mar. 2016. <<http://faculty.webster.edu/corbetre/haiti/history/recent/lebrun.htm>>. President Aristide’s Speech Friday September 27, 1991 Translated by Haiti Observateur

“Haïti.” Constitution Impériale Du 20 Mai 1805, Digithèque MJP. N.p., n.d. Web. 05 Mar. 2016.

“Haiti Elections.” Haiti Elections. N.p., n.d. Web. 17 Dec. 2015.

Haiti Grassroots Watch. “Haiti: Aid or Trade? The Nefarious Effects of U.S. Policies.” Global Research; Center for Research on Globalization. Haiti Liberte, 6 Nov. 2013. Web. <<http://www.globalresearch.ca/haiti-aid-or-trade-the-nefarious-effects-of-u-s-policies/5357204>>.

“Haïti Insécurité: 3 Personnes Qui Affichaient Des Photos De Candidats Tués à Carrefour.” Haiti Press Network. N.p., 23 July 2015. Web. <[http://hpnhaiti.com/site/index.php?option=com\\_content&view=article&id=16374%3Ahaiti-insecurite-3-personnes-qui-affichaient-des-photos-de-candidats-tues-a-carrefour&catid=18%3Aelections-2010&Itemid=61](http://hpnhaiti.com/site/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=16374%3Ahaiti-insecurite-3-personnes-qui-affichaient-des-photos-de-candidats-tues-a-carrefour&catid=18%3Aelections-2010&Itemid=61)>.

“Haiti Presidential Polls Met with Skepticism and Interest.” Miamiherald. N.p., n.d. Web. 17 Dec. 2015.

Hallward, Peter. *Damming the Flood: Haiti, Aristide, and the Politics of Containment*. London: Verso, 2007. Print.

Hartman, Tim. “Americans Step Up Business With Haiti Despite Sanctions – Humanitarian Exemption Lets Trade Increase.” *Seattle Times* 18 Feb. 1994. *Seattle Times*. Web.

Heine, Jorge, and Andrew S. Thompson. “Haiti’s Unending Crisis of Governance: Food, the Constitution, and the Struggle for Power by Robert Fatton Jr.” *Fixing Haiti*:

MINUSTAH and beyond. Tokyo: United Nations UP, 2011. N. pag. Print.

“The Influence of Aid Changes on African Election Outcomes.” ResearchGate. N.p., n.d. Web. 17 Dec. 2015.

“L’Insécurité Ne Faiblit Pas, à Moins De Trois Semaines De La Fermeture De La Campagne électorale.” *AlterPresse*. N.p., 23 July 2015. Web. 11 Apr. 2016. <<http://www.alterpresse.org/spip.php?article18532#.VvwjwxMrLMX>>.

International Foundation for Electoral Systems, IFES Haitian Election report; July 1990 – April 1991, retrieved from the IFES website: [http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf\\_docs/PDABF922.pdf](http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/PDABF922.pdf)

“IPU PARLINE Database: HAITI (Chambre Des Députés), Election Archives.” IPU PARLINE Database: HAITI (Chambre Des Députés), Election Archives. N.p., n.d. Web. 05 Mar. 2016.

Johnson, Jake. “Revealed: USAID Funded Group Supporting Haitian President in 2011.” *USAID Funded Group Supporting Haitian President*. Aljazeera, 15 July 2015. Web. 13 Mar. 2016.

Lewis, Linden. *Caribbean Sovereignty, Development and Democracy in an Age of Globalization*. New York, NY: Routledge, 2012. Print.

Lindberg, Staffan I. *Democratization by Elections: A New Mode of Transition*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins UP, 2009. Print.

Mann, Jim. “Congress to Probe CIA-Haiti Ties : Intelligence: Members of Both Houses Say They Will Investigate. Reports Say Agency Financed Some Leaders Involved in Coup.” *LA Times* 2 Nov. 1993, Investigations sec.: n. pag. *Los Angeles Times*, 02 Nov. 1993. Web. 13 Mar. 2016.

Mombrun, Reginald. *Haiti: A Primer on Its Revolution and Diaspora*. N.p.: Print.

Moyo, Dambisa. “Why Foreign Aid Is Hurting Africa.” *Wall Street Journal*. N.p., 21 Mar. 2009. Web. <<http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB123758895999200083>>.

National Democratic Institute for International Affairs & Council of Freely-Elected Heads of Government, The 1990 General Elections in Haiti; National delegation report, retrieved from The Carter Center Website: <http://www.cartercenter.org/documents/electionreports/democracy/FinalReportHaiti1990.pdf>

Noriega, Roger F. "Haiti's Politicians Are the Ones Accountable in Election Chaos." *Miamiherald*. Miami Herald, 12 Mar. 2016. Web. 15 Mar. 2016.

O'Conner, Maura R. "Two Yeas Later, Haitian Earthquake Death Toll in Dispute." *Columbia Journalism Review*. N.p., 12 Jan. 2012. Web. 12 Mar. 2016.

Olivier, Louis-Joseph. "La Rue Annule Les élections Du 24 Janvier." *Le Nouvelliste*. N.p., 22 Jan. 2016. Web. <<http://lenouvelliste.com/lenouvelliste/article/154798/La-rue-annule-les-elections-du-24-janvier>>.

"President Michel Martelly Accused Of Having Over 66 Political Parties." *Haiti Observer*. N.p., 13 June 2015. Web. 14 Apr. 2016. <<http://www.haitiobserver.com/blog/president-michel-martelly-accused-of-having-over-66-politica.html>>.

Quigley, Bill. "Haiti Numbers - 27 Days After Quake." *The Huffington Post*. *TheHuffingtonPost.com*, 25 May 2011. Web. 10 Apr. 2016. <[http://www.huffingtonpost.com/bill-quigley/haiti-numbers---27-days-a\\_b\\_454755.html](http://www.huffingtonpost.com/bill-quigley/haiti-numbers---27-days-a_b_454755.html)>.

"Revealed: USAID Funded Group Supporting Haitian President in 2011." *USAID Funded Group Supporting Haitian President*. N.p., n.d. Web. 17 Dec. 2015.

Réseau National de Défense des Droits Humains, Campagne électorale sur fond de violences; le RNDDH tire la sonnette d'alarme. 5 Aug. 2015, retrieved from the RNDDH website: [https://gallery.mailchimp.com/9522ccb17971e097d3ff160b5/files/6\\_Violences\\_lectorales\\_5\\_aug\\_2015.pdf](https://gallery.mailchimp.com/9522ccb17971e097d3ff160b5/files/6_Violences_lectorales_5_aug_2015.pdf)

Réseau National de Défense des Droits Humains, Lettre Ouverte aux Membres du Conseil

Electoral Provisoire. 23 Feb. 2015, retrieved from the RNDDH website: <http://rnddh.org/lettre-ouverte-aux-membres-du-conseil-electoral-provisoire/>

Riddell, Roger. *Does Foreign Aid Really Work?* Oxford: Oxford UP, 2007. Print.

Rosnick, David. *The Organization of American States in Haiti: Election Monitoring or Political Intervention?* Publication. Washington, DC: n.p., 2009. The Organization of American States in Haiti: Election Monitoring or Political Intervention? Center for Economic and Policy Research, Aug. 2011. Web. 13 Mar. 2016.

Sciolino, Elaine. "Mission to Haiti; C.I.A. Reportedly Taking a Role in Haiti." *New York Times* 28 Sept. 1994, World sec.: n. pag. *New York Times*. Web.

Sen, Amartya. "Democracy as a Universal Value." *Journal of Democracy* 10 (1999): 3-17.

"Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs)." WHO. World Health Organization, n.d. Web. <<http://www.who.int/trade/glossary/story084/en/>>.

Thomas, Clive. "Globalization, Structural Adjustment and Security: The Collapse of the Post-Colonial Developmental State in the Caribbean". *Global Development Studies Volume One*. Published by International Development Options (1998).

Trouillot, Michel-Rolph. *Haiti, State against Nation: The Origins and Legacy of Duvalierism*. New York: Monthly Review, 1990. Print.

United Nations, Security Council resolution 940, S/RES/940 (31 July 1994), available from [www.un.org/Docs/scres/1994/scres94.htm](http://www.un.org/Docs/scres/1994/scres94.htm).

"US Congress Passes Aid Accountability Legislation as Local Procurement Falls in Haiti." *CEPR; Haiti Relief and Reconstruction Blog*. Center for Economic and Policy Research, 28 July 2014. Web. <<http://cepr.net/blogs/haiti-relief-and-reconstruction-watch/us-congress-passes-aid-accountability-legislation-as-local-procurement-falls-in-haiti>>.

"U.S. Relations With Haiti." U.S. Department of State. U.S. Department of State, 03 Mar.

2016. Web. 05 Mar. 2016.

Weiner, Tim. "C.I.A. Formed Haitian Unit Later Tied to Narcotics Trade." *New York Times*

13 Nov. 1993, *World sec.*: n. pag. *New York Times*, 14 Nov. 1993. Web.

"Whitney, Kathleen Marie. "Sin, Fraph, and the Cia: U.s. Covert Action in Haiti."

*Southwestern Journal of Law and Trade in the Americas* 3 (1996): 303-487.

Web. 12 Mar. 2016.

"3 Blessés à Petit Goâve Lors Des Violences électorales." *Radio Metropole Haiti*. N.p.,

24 July 2015. Web. 11 Apr. 2016. <[http://www.metropolehaiti.com/metropole/full\\_une\\_fr.php?id=26843](http://www.metropolehaiti.com/metropole/full_une_fr.php?id=26843)>.

"5 Things to Know About The Haitian Elections." *NBC News*. N.p., n.d. Web. 17 Dec. 2015.



